MATURE MINORS UNBORN CHILDREN PARENTAL OBLIGATIONS ADULT CHILDREN
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"A patient in the hospital maybe fed through the mouth, through the nose, or through the veins. When sugar solutions are given intravenously it is called intravenous feeding. So the hospital's own terminology recognizes as feeding the process of putting nutrition into one's system via the veins. Hence the attendant administering the transfusion is feeding the patient through the veins, and the patient receiving it is eating through his veins." -- The WATCHTOWER magazine, July 1, 1951.
Jehovah's Witnesses were BAMBOOZLED into believing that receiving an infusion of human blood into their body's circulatory system was scientifically the exact same thing as eating or ingesting blood into their body's digestive system. Jehovah's Witnesses refuse to acknowledge that when blood is eaten as "food" that the ingested blood enters the human body's separate and distinct digestive system, where it is treated by the digestive system exactly the same as a hotdog, a potato chip, or any other item of "food". It will be completely digested and broken down into proteins, carbohydrates, fats, and waste -- which are then either assimilated or excreted by the body.
Jehovah's Witnesses refuse to acknowledge the distinction that when human blood is TRANSFUSED into another human's circulatory system that the transfused human blood remains to be human blood and continues to function as human blood. That is the very point of a blood transfusion. The very purpose of a blood transfusion is to SAVE HUMAN LIFE. Blood transfusions are based on RESPECT FOR HUMAN LIFE.
The WatchTower Cult uses Old Testament guidelines regarding the disposal of blood from slaughtered animals to teach Jehovah's Witnesses that blood is "sacred" because blood is the "symbol" of life. Then, in the same breath, the WatchTower Cult turns around and requires Jehovah's Witnesses to SACRIFICE ACTUAL HUMAN LIFE to maintain the SANCTITY OF THE SYMBOL. WatchTower Cult doctrine MORONICALLY places a higher value on the SYMBOL OF HUMAN LIFE than it does ACTUAL HUMAN LIFE.
In fact, the Old Testament permitted the eating of "unbled" animal meat, which the Old Testament equated to eating animal blood itself. In emergency situations, when humans needed to eat unbled meat in order to sustain their life, the Mosaic Law permitted such desperate humans to eat "unbled" meat. Once their life had been saved, those humans were then required for a few days to fulfill the Mosaic Law's requirements for being "unclean". Thus, THE BIBLE RECOGNIZES AND TEACHES that the SUSTAINING OF HUMAN LIFE is MORE IMPORTANT than maintaining the "sanctity" of the mere "symbol" of life. To do otherwise would be doing exactly what the MORONIC WatchTower Cult does. It would make the SYMBOL more SACRED than the THING SYMBOLIZED.
In fact, the WatchTower Cult is MISLEADING JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES TO DISOBEY GOD and violate the Holy Scriptures in one of the most serious ways possible. GOD created humans in HIS image. GOD considers human life to be SACRED. A Jehovah's Witness who extinguishes SACRED HUMAN LIFE in order to MORONICALLY maintain the sanctity of the SYMBOL of that SACRED LIFE varies little from those who profane SACRED HUMAN LIFE by committing suicide. Those Jehovah's Witness Elders who teach and police this MORONIC WATCHTOWER CULT DOCTRINE vary little from MURDERERS. The Bible is clear as to how GOD views MURDER and how GOD views and eventually deals with MURDERERS.
The WatchTower Cult's SATANIC twisting of GOD'S WORD and BAMBOOZLING of its' Jehovah's Witness members in order to establish its own version of the GENERIC CULTIC REQUIREMENT of "POTENTIAL MARTYRDOM FOR ALL - ACTUAL MARTYRDOM FOR A FEW" would be laughable if not for the fact that it has lead to the MEANINGLESS DEATHS OF THOUSANDS OF HUMANS ACROSS PLANET EARTH since 1945, and it will continue to cause the pointless deaths of THOUSANDS MORE IN THE FUTURE until LIBERAL GOVERNMENTS finally wake up and declare "NO MORE OF THIS BACK-DOOR SUICIDE STUPIDITY UNDER THE GUISE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM". Legal precedent is already there. Stupid religious belief is unfettered. Stupid religious practice is not.
American law regarding Jehovah's Witnesses and their refusal to accept blood transfusions is somewhat settled and is fairly simple. Competent adults have the constitutional right to refuse a blood transfusion, even if such refusal means they will die. Many Jehovah's Witness parents have exercised their constitutional right to choose death rather than accept a blood transfusion.
Jehovah's Witness Parents will attempt to make the same "death decision" for their minor children, but practically every hospital will attempt to obtain a court order which will permit them to administer a medically necessary blood transfusion over the parent's objections - assuming that the Jehovah's Witness Child is still alive by the time all the legalities are completed. Borderline areas, such as Jehovah's Witness Mothers pregnant with "fetuses" and Jehovah's Witness Minors approaching "majority", are scenarios in which the WatchTower Society has been slowly chipping away in American courtrooms. Court cases dealing with such are posted on subsequent webpages.
Readers should keep in mind that the following cases are merely those which could be located. One should not assume that because no cases are listed in a certain year that no such scenarios went through the courts during that year. One can probably assume that when many cases are listed for a certain year, such as 1992, then that is, at the very least, the minimum number of cases that may very well occur in any given year. Researchers will also start to notice something not noticed by casual browsers. That is, groupings of cases from the same state, or adjacent states, in a certain year, or consecutive years. This phenomenon was most likely the result of one case getting media attention simply by chance. However, the publicity from that case then brought the issue to the attention of other reporters in the same and nearby coverage areas, who then put such cases on their own "radar screen", and thereafter reported cases that they previously had been missing. It is simply no telling how many 1000s of such cases went "unreported" over the decades in the United States alone. Keeping in mind that the vast majority of Jehovah's Witnesses live in foreign countries, with most of those being third-world countries with bare-bones legal and medical systems, the potential body count is staggering.
Readers should be aware that the reason that few cases have been posted in the past four years is due to tightened confidentiality rules which in many instances now prevent cases from being reported, and in other cases deter cases from being reported due to fear of violating rules. Increasing numbers of JW Parents will mean more instances of children being denied life-saving blood transfusions, not fewer cases.
"Neither you nor anybody else can stop me. ... This child [Betty] is exercising her God-given right and her constitutional right to preach the gospel, and no creature has a right to interfere with God's commands."
"As the case reaches us, the questions are no longer open whether what the child did was a "sale" or an "offer to sell" within [Mass statute] or was "work" within [Mass statute]. The state court's decision has foreclosed them adversely to appellant as a matter of state law. The only question remaining therefore is whether, as constituted and applied, the statute is valid. ...
"[Prince] does not stand on freedom of the press. Regarding it as secular, she concedes it may be restricted as Massachusetts has done. Hence, she rests squarely on freedom of religion under the First Amendment applied by the Fourteenth to the states. She buttresses this foundation, however, with a claim of parental right as secured by the due process clause of the latter Amendment. Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, ... These guaranties, she thinks, guard alike herself and the child in what they have done. Thus, two claimed liberties are at stake. One is the parent's, to bring up the child in the way he should go, which, for appellant, means to teach him the tenets and the practices of their faith. The other freedom is the child's, to observe these, and among them is 'to preach the gospel ... by public distribution' of 'Watchtower' and 'Consolation', in conformity with the scripture: 'A little child shall lead them.'
"If, by this position, appellant seeks for freedom of conscience a broader protection than for freedom of the mind, it may be doubted that any of the great liberties insured by the First Article can be given higher place than the others. All have preferred position in our basic scheme. Schneider v. State, ... Cantwell v. Connecticut, ... . All are interwoven there together. Differences there are, in them and in the modes appropriate for their exercise. But they have unity in the charter's prime place because they have unity in their human sources and functionings. Heart and mind are not identical. Intuitive faith and reasoned judgment are not the same. Spirit is not always thought. But, in the everyday business of living, secular or otherwise, these variant aspects of personality find inseparable expression in a thousand ways. They cannot be altogether parted in law more than in life.
"To make accommodation between these freedoms and an exercise of state authority always is delicate. It hardly could be more so than in such a clash as this case presents. On one side is the obviously earnest claim for freedom of conscience and religious practice. With it is allied the parent's claim to authority in her own household and in the rearing of her children. The parent's conflict with the state over control of the child and his training is serious enough when only secular matters are concerned. It becomes the more so when an element of religious conviction enters. Against these sacred private interests, basic in a democracy, stand the interests of society to protect the welfare of children, and the state's assertion of authority to that end, made here in a manner conceded valid if only secular things were involved. The last is no mere corporate concern of official authority. It is the interest of youth itself, and of the whole community, that children be both safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and independent well developed men and citizens. Between contrary pulls of such weight, the safest and most objective recourse is to the lines already marked out, not precisely but for guides, in narrowing the no man's land where this battle has gone on.
"The rights of children to exercise their religion, and of parents to give them religious training and to encourage them in the practice of religious belief, as against preponderant sentiment and assertion of state power voicing it, have had recognition here, most recently in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, ... Previously, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, ... this Court had sustained the parent's authority to provide religious with secular schooling, and the child's right to receive it, as against the state's requirement of attendance at public schools. And in ... this Court had sustained the parent's authority to provide religious with secular schooling, and the child's right to receive it, as against the state's requirement of attendance at public schools. And in Meyer v. Nebraska, ... children's rights to receive teaching in languages other than the nation's common tongue were guarded against the state's encroachment. It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra. And it is in recognition of this that these decisions have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.
"But the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest, as against a claim of religious liberty.Reynolds v. United States, ... Davis v. Beason, ... . And neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in youth's wellbeing, the state, as parens patriae, may restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor and in many other ways. Its authority is not nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the child's course of conduct on religion or conscience. Thus, he cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.People v. Pierson, ... . The catalogue need not be lengthened. It is sufficient to show what indeed appellant hardly disputes, that the state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare, and that this includes, to some extent, matters of conscience and religious conviction.
"But it is said the state cannot do so here. This, first, because when state action impinges upon a claimed religious freedom, it must fall unless shown to be necessary for or conducive to the child's protection against some clear and present danger, cf. Schenck v. United States, ... and, it is added, there was no such showing here. The child's presence on the street, with her guardian, distributing or offering to distribute the magazines, it is urged, was in no way harmful to her, nor, in any event, more so than the presence of many other children at the same time and place, engaged in shopping and other activities not prohibited. Accordingly, in view of the preferred position the freedoms of the First Article occupy, the statute in its present application must fall. It cannot be sustained by any presumption of validity. Cf. Schneider v. State, ... . And, finally, it is said, the statute is, as to children, an absolute prohibition, not merely a reasonable regulation, of the denounced activity.
"Concededly a statute or ordinance identical in terms with [Mass statute] except that it is applicable to adults or all persons generally, would be invalid. ... But the mere fact a state could not wholly prohibit this form of adult activity, whether characterized locally as a 'sale' or otherwise, does not mean it cannot do so for children.Such a conclusion granted would mean that a state could impose no greater limitation upon child labor than upon adult labor. Or, if an adult were free to enter dance halls, saloons, and disreputable places generally, in order to discharge his conceived religious duty to admonish or dissuade persons from frequenting such places, so would be a child with similar convictions and objectives, if not alone, then in the parent's company, against the state's command.
"The state's authority over children's activities is broader than over like actions of adults. This is peculiarly true of public activities and in matters of employment. A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this against impeding restraints and dangers within a broad range of selection. Among evils most appropriate for such action are the crippling effects of child employment, more especially in public places, and the possible harms arising from other activities subject to all the diverse influences of the street. It is too late now to doubt that legislation appropriately designed to reach such evils is within the state's police power, whether against the parent's claim to control of the child or one that religious scruples dictate contrary action.
"It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary use of highways. But even in such use, streets afford dangers for them not affecting adults. And in other uses, whether in work or in other things, this difference may be magnified. This is so not only when children are unaccompanied, but certainly to some extent when they are with their parents. What may be wholly permissible for adults therefore may not be so for children, either with or without their parents' presence.
"Street preaching, whether oral or by handing out literature, is not the primary use of the highway, even for adults. While for them it cannot be wholly prohibited, it can be regulated within reasonable limits in accommodation to the primary and other incidental uses. But, for obvious reasons, notwithstanding appellant's contrary view, the validity of such a prohibition applied to children not accompanied by an older person hardly would seem on to question. The case reduces itself therefore to the question whether the presence of the child's guardian puts a limit to the state's power. That fact may lessen the likelihood that some evils the legislation seeks to avert will occur. But it cannot forestall all of them. The zealous though lawful exercise of the right to engage in propagandizing the community, whether in religious, political or other matters, may, and at times does, create situations difficult enough for adults to cope with and wholly inappropriate for children, especially of tender years, to face. Other harmful possibilities could be stated, of emotional excitement and psychological or physical injury.Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves. Massachusetts has determined that an absolute prohibition, though one limited to streets and public places and to the incidental uses proscribed, is necessary to accomplish its legitimate objectives. Its power to attain them is broad enough to reach these peripheral instances in which the parent's supervision may reduce, but cannot eliminate entirely, the ill effects of the prohibited conduct. We think that, with reference to the public proclaiming of religion, upon the streets and in other similar public places, the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults, as is true in the case of other freedoms, and the rightful boundary of its power has not been crossed in this case.
"In so ruling, we dispose also of appellant's argument founded upon denial of equal protection. It falls with that based on denial of religious freedom, since, in this instance, the one is but another phrasing of the other. Shortly, the contention is that the street, for Jehovah's Witnesses and their children, is their church, since their conviction makes it so, and to deny them access to it for religious purposes, as was done here, has the same effect as excluding altar boys, youthful choristers, and other children from the edifices in which they practice their religious beliefs and worship. The argument hardly needs more than statement, after what has been said, to refute it. However Jehovah's Witnesses may conceive them, the public highways have not become their religious property merely by their assertion. And there is no denial of equal protection in excluding their children from doing there what no other children may do.
"Our ruling does not extend beyond the facts the case presents. We neither lay the foundation "for any [that is, every] state intervention in the indoctrination and participation of children in religion" which may be done "in the name of their health and welfare" nor give warrant for "every limitation on their religious training and activities." The religious training and indoctrination of children may be accomplished in many ways, some of which, as we have noted, have received constitutional protection through decisions of this Court. These and all others except the public proclaiming of religion on the streets, if this may be taken as either training or indoctrination of the proclaimer, remain unaffected by the decision. ... ."
READERS SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THE LACK OF COURT CASES POSTED FOR THE MOST RECENT YEARS IS BECAUSE OF ENHANCED CONFIDENTIALLY RULES (HIPAA) THAT HAVE ALL BUT STOPPED ACCESS TO MOST OF THE HOSPITAL INCIDENTS ONCE REPORTED BY NEWS MEDIA.
However, as PROOF that the issues which we address in the following webpages are just as relevant in 2017 as they were in the 1990s, 1980s, 1970s, 1960s, and 1950s, here is a JULY 2017 plea for help published in the social advice column of the major Philippine newspaper. Note that the author of this letter makes it clearer in her second paragraph that she also was a devout Jehovah's Witness until she was shunned by the WatchTower Cult and divorced by her JW Husband. Readers should also take from this letter how the WatchTower Cult is less careful in third-world countries about doing things which would instantly receive bad publicity in Europe or North America.
My husband of 11 years left me because I allowed my daughter to have a blood transfusion after she contracted dengue. My husband is a devout Jehovahís Witness and his religion believes that having a blood transfusion is a sin against God. I canít believe how selfish he is. Our daughterís life was at stake and she needed blood! He said this procedure would make Jehovah angry. He said he was willing to sacrifice our daughterís life to please God. Without his permission, I donated my own blood for my daughter.
Since I have broken this rule, my husband dumped me. Itís heartbreaking that my husband put his religion first. He even warned that our daughter and I would be punished for what Iíve done. Itís been seven months since my husband left us. I am now a solo parent. My husband even refuses to give financial support because he said he didnít want to support a disobedient wife and daughter. Even my church has disowned me. My daughter and I are not allowed to attend services at Kingdom Hall anymore. Our fellow Jehovah Witnesses friends wonít even help me or talk to me. But Iím still lucky I have my family to back me up. Am I a bad Christian? Does God still love me?
In August 2011, the Broward County Florida State Attorney's Office told a reporter that just in the past 3 years that his office had handled a dozen court cases, just in that single county, where Jehovah's Witness Parents had refused to consent to life-saving blood transfusions for their minor children. Stated that office, "[Jehovah's Witness Parents] want the state to get involved to save their kid, so they don't have to answer to their congregation."
In August 2011, the 4 year-old daughter of unidentified Jehovah's Witness Parents, who live in North Miami Beach, Florida, needed blood transfusions during surgery to remove a brain tumor at Joe DiMaggio Children's Hospital in Hollywood. In this case, although the JW Parents refused to give their consent for the transfusions, they also told the hospital that they would not object if the hospital sought a court order to administer the transfusions. The JW Parents did not even appear at the court hearing. Interestingly, the child's sister later told a reporter that transfusions were not needed during the surgery, while the local DA said that transfusions were administered.
Starting in 1993, Florida law does not permit doctors or hospitals to appeal directly to their local court for judicial intervention in these cases, but rather forces hospitals to go through the additional legal hoop of asking the local State Attorney's Office to do so for them. In this case, the local SA noted that some local JWs are smart enough to play the system from both ends. The JWs object just enough to satisfy their WatchTower Cult minders, while hoping that the state steps in and orders blood transfusions to save their children's lives.
In December 2010, an unidentified Jehovah's Witness Teenager in Palm Beach County, Florida, who was suffering from life-threatening anemia, received a court-ordered blood transfusion after their Jehovah's Witness Parents refused to grant consent to doctors.
IN RE ROCK SANOZIER JR. was a June 2011 Florida court decision. African-American Jehovah's Witness Parents, Rock W. Sanozier, age 40, and Jean R. Sanozier, age 44, of Fort Lauderdale, Florida took their three year-old son, who suffers with sickle-cell anemia, to Broward General Medical Center on June 21, 2011, where the child was diagnosed with pneumonia and a spleen clogged with blood. After treatments with various medications failed to help the child, the JW Parents were informed that only blood transfusions, and possibly removal of the spleen, would save their son's life. However, Rock Sanozier and Jean Sanozier refused to give doctors permission for life-saving blood transfusions. ***The Sanoziers parroted suggestions published in WatchTower publications that a blood transfusion would give their son the "personality" of the blood donor, and refused to grant their consent. Doctors were forced to seek an emergency court order from the local Broward County courts. Permission for the life-saving blood transfusions was granted just as the JW child neared death. It is assumed that the child's life was saved, but due to tightened confidentially rules (HIPAA) , the hospital was not allowed to comment further, and the parents have not responded to media requests for further info.
***Having been reared as a 4th generation Jehovah's Witness, this editor's remembers caucasian Jehovah's Witness Parents, Pete and Dorothy Blackford (both deceased), lamenting the fact that their son Richard Blackford was marrying an African-American (google offspring of this marriage). They blamed his pick of an African-American spouse on the fact that a blood transfusion had been forced on him at birth. They said that they had always wondered why he had always "liked" African-Americans since he was a child, and given his choice of a wife, they now "knew" that he must have been given blood from an African-American donor.
IN RE MAKAYLA HILL and HILL v. DR. DARLING, DR. TURNER, NORTH MISSISSIPPI MEDICAL CENTER, AND LEE COUNTY DEPT OF HUMAN SERVICES, and HILL v. NORTH MISSISSIPPI MEDICAL CENTER are three related Mississippi federal and state court cases.
Cory Hill and Stefanie Hill are Jehovah's Witnesses living in Tupelo, Mississippi. In 2006, this JW Couple's first daughter was successfully delivered by cesarean section at North Mississippi Medical Center. Stefanie Hill again became pregnant in 2008, and Dr. Kristen Turner, an obstetrician and staff physician at NMMC, suspected Hill might have intrauterine growth retardationand preeclampsia. Hill was admitted to NMMC for treatment and monitoring. Her unborn child was observed to lack fetal heart tone variability and decelerations. The Hills told NMMC physicians they would not consent to any blood transfusions. Dr. Turner concluded it would be best to proceed with an emergency cesarean section. In June 2008, Hill gave birth to a fifteen week premature baby girl, Makayla Hill, who weighed less than a pound.
On or about June 11, 2008, the attending neonatologist, Dr. Bryan Darling, believed Makayla needed a blood transfusion. The Hills would not consent. An emergency hearing was held that day. The court found the Hills' refusal to accept a transfusion was"medical neglect". A Temporary Emergency Order was issued by the Youth Court of Lee County, Mississippi. This order appointed the Lee County Department of Human Services as custodian of Makayla. DHS consented for Makayla to receive blood transfusions. Makayla died on June 30, 2008.
Thereafter, the Hills filed a legal motion to continue the custody hearing of Makayla Hill; filed a legal motion for an order setting aside the finding of medical neglect; filed a legal motion seeking release of the court file and DHS intake records; and filed a legal motion for an autopsy. All this gives the appearance of attempting to completely blame the death of their 15 week premature baby on the doctors and hospital staff who did everything in their power to save that child's life.
In March 2009, the Hills petitioned the state court for even more hospital records. At some point, it appears that a federal lawsuit also ensued regarding the release of even more records from NMMC.
In October 2009, the Hills filed their main federal lawsuit against Doctors Turner and Darling, NMMC, and DHS, alleging a long list of legal wrongs. In September 2010, the USDC summarily dismissed ALL CLAIMS against the two doctors. Outcome of case against NMMC and DHS unknown, but each foreseeable.
IN THE MATTER OF AMESHA BINNS was a 2009 Indiana court decision. In May 2009, a daughter weighing less than 2 pounds was born 10 weeks prematurely to Pierre A. Binns Sr. and Stephanie C. Binns at Fort Wayne's Dupont Hospital. Suffering from anemia, the African-American Jehovah's Witness Parents refused to give their consent for any blood transfusions that might be needed to prevent their child from dying. Stephanie Binns was quoted by reporters as professing: "All our beliefs are Bible-based. It's not like we're trying to hurt our child. We're trying to prevent our child from being hurt."
Richard D. Dellinger, a MORONIC member of the WatchTower Society's local Hospital Liaison Committee, told reporters that blood transfusions are forbidden by the Bible and were unproven medically. That FOOL ran around proclaiming that doctors could not guarantee that administering blood transfusions would save the life of Amesha Binns, or any other life. Duuuuhhhhh!!!! Anyone with a three-digit IQ knows that no doctor can "guarantee" the success of any medical treatment. At best, some doctors will guestimate the "odds" of success. Dupont Hospital sought and obtained an emergency court order authorizing any needed transfusions. The Hospital testified that Baby Girl Binns was in the neonatal intensive care unit, and would need at least one blood transfusion and possibly more. Outcome unknown.
ON APPLICATION OF NORTHEAST GEORGIA MEDICAL CENTER was a 2005 Georgia court decision. In June 2005, an unidentified Gainsville, Georgia area Jehovah's Witness couple refused to permit doctors at the Northeast Georgia Medical Center to administer a medically required blood transfusions to their premature infant. The Medical Center petitioned the local court for temporary guardianship and authority to administer the blood transfusions, which their doctors testified more likely than not were necessary to save the infant's life. Superior Court Judge John Girardeau granted the hospital's petition.
"In the midst of an emergency, the district court was confronted with the task of balancing the competing interests of the child, the parents, the hospital and the State. Throughout the proceedings, the district court took numerous steps to protect the interests of the child and the parents, including requiring notice and a hearing within twenty-four hours after the original order, allowing Jason and Rebecca time to obtain counsel prior to reaching a final determination, protecting Jason and Rebecca's privacy interests, requiring the hospital to provide medical testimony regarding H.S.'s condition and limiting the final order to only those powers necessary to protect H.S.'s interests. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded Valley Hospital temporary guardianship of H.S. pursuant to NRS ______. We do not perceive the provisions of NRS _____ as governing exclusively in cases involving minors and medical emergencies. ... ..."Other jurisdictions have uniformly held that when medical treatment is available and necessary to save a minor's life, the state may intervene. ... Jason and Rebecca concede that the parents' right to the care, custody and control of their children is not absolute. However, because the issue of a state's right to compel the administration of a blood transfusion to a minor when the parents oppose the treatment is an issue of first impression in Nevada, we will address it here.
"'Substantive due process guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property for arbitrary reasons.'" The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects those liberty interests that are deemed fundamental and are 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.' Certain family privacy rights, including the parent-child relationship, have therefore been recognized as fundamental rights. We have adopted a 'reasonableness test' to address family privacy cases involving 'competing interests within the family.' This test '"implicitly calibrates the level of scrutiny in each case to match the particular degree of intrusion upon the parents' interests."'
"While a parent has a fundamental liberty interest in the 'care, custody, and management' of his child, that interest is not absolute. 'The state also has an interest in the welfare of children and may limit parental authority,' even permanently depriving parents of their children. Therefore, while Jason and Rebecca have a parental interest in the care of their son, both the State and H.S. have an interest in preserving the child's life. As H.S. is unable to make decisions for himself, the State's interest is heightened. Jason and Rebecca's liberty interest in practicing their religion must also give way to the child's welfare. Hence, the district court found that Jason and Rebecca's refusal to consent to treatment put H.S.'s life at substantial risk. Additionally, the State has an interest in protecting 'the ethical integrity of the medical profession,' and in allowing hospitals the full opportunity to care for patients under their control, especially when medical science is available to save that patient's life.
"Here, the child's interest in self-preservation and the State's interests in protecting the welfare of children and the integrity of medical care outweigh the parents' interests in the care, custody and management of their children, and their religious freedom. The combined weight of the interests of the child and the State are great and, therefore, mandate interference with Jason and Rebecca's parental rights."
"We reject the Hartts' suggestion that Justin's Jehovah's Witness identification card somehow put the County on notice that Justin or the Hartts objected to such post-autopsy donations under Health and Safety Code section 7152. The card referred exclusively to medical treatment for someone who was still alive. The card was silent regarding post-death disposition of remains. Moreover, the form Mr. Hartt signed at the coroner's office referred only generally to control of disposition of the remains. The form did not purport to waive or contradict statutes establishing the coroner's control over the body while it was within the coroner's legitimate control."
Blood Transfusions: A History and Evaluation of the Religious, Biblical, and Medical Objections (Jehovah's Witnesses perspective)