JW DIVORCES - 1950s

There is no such thing as a "national child custody law". Although similar, each state's legislature has established its own state laws regarding child custody, and each state's courts interpret those laws using legal standards that may vary from that used by courts in other states.

As site visitors will quickly see from reading the following summaries, state courts currently apply one of the following three different legal standards when deciding these cases:

Child custody court case decisions are typically lengthy and complex, and tyically deal with a multitude of legal issues. The following case summaries will generally include only with those issues in which the WatchTower/Jehovah's Witness religion was a factor. Some summaries may omit one or more issues relevant to the court's final decision(s), but not deemed relevant to the theme of this website.

BOND v. BOND was a 1959 West Virginia Supreme Court decision. In November 1956, Marjorie M. Bond filed for a divorce from William J. B. Bond, Jr. In June 1957, Marjorie M. Bond was granted a divorce, with custody of the three minor children. William Bond was granted visitation "at reasonable times, and so long as defendant conducts himself in a proper and decorous manner upon such visitations". The divorce decree also gave Marjorie M. Bond the right to occupy the home owned jointly by the parties, and to use the contents thereof. In addition to monthly alimony and child support of $100, William Bond was also required to pay the monthly mortgage.

In August 1957, William Bond filed for modification of the divorce decree. In addition to asking for specified visitation on Saturday evenings, William Bond requested that the court specify that the home which he was being made to provide for his ex-wife and children be limited to the ex-wife's and chuildren's personal use as a residential premises.

In fact, the home was being used as a meeting place for the local Huntington, West Virginia Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses. Marjorie M. Bond, herself, testified that the home was used as a meeting place for various Jehovah's Witnesses activities on at least four days of the week. The home was used as a meeting place on Tuesday evenings, Wednesday evenings, Saturday mornings, and Sunday mornings for those Jehovah's Witnesses who were going to do door-to-door recruiting in Huntington. On Wednesday nights, an hour long "Bible Study" meeting was also held. The Tuesday evening meetings may have also been used as training sessions similar to the JW's current "Service Meetings" - used to train JWs for recruiting.

During the August 1957 trial, William Bond's attorney tried to keep the beliefs of the Jehovah's Witnesses from becoming an issue, since he knew that such would become a problem if he won, and then the decision was appealed, as did happen. William Bond's attorney simply wanted to make the point that his client should not be made to pay the mortgage on, and furnish a building for a religious group, of which his client did not approve. They simply asked that the home be limited to residential use by his ex-wife and children.

However, on cross-examination, the unknown (likely WatchTower-supplied) attorney for Marjorie M. Bond asked leading questions of William Bond in order to get him to discuss his opposition to the WatchTower Society. In fact, the cross-examination of William Bond was quite lengthy, dealing almost entirely with the tenets of Jehovah's Witnesses. His own attorney finally objected, but not before this interesting testimony about Bond's young son was given:

"A few years ago the oldest boy, which is nine now, went to school, and when she had joined the Jehovah's Witnesses, she refused the boy the right to say the allegiance to the flag, and in turn that made him nervous, and we have taken him to doctors to find out what was the matter with him, and we found out there was nothing the matter with him, outside of a nervous condition, and then I found out that she went so far as to go down to school, and refused for the boy to say the allegiance to the flag, and then she kept the boy from playing in the yard, by making him read the literature, which took him around an hour and a half. ... That particular part there, was last summer, and she threatened to whip him, or if he didn't go to the meetings, she would put him to bed. Then they don't believe in voting. They don't believe in saluting the flag, and they don't believe in fighting, and they don't believe in hell, and they don't believe in the blood, and they don't believe in Thanksgiving, and they don't believe in Christmas, New Year's or any type of celebration."

William Bond's attorney explained his objection to the line of questioning:

"The basis of the objection, your Honor, is that this is not proper cross examination, and further, that this line of questioning is going into the merits of the particular religious sect and that in no place in the petition or notice filed herein is there any objection made so far as Mr. Bond is concerned as to her religion. In asking the Court to restrict - not to restrict - but to limit the use of this dwelling house for residential purposes only is not to restrict Mrs. Bond in any form whatsoever in her religion, and I believe that the testimony in the cross examination here is away off base and has nothing to do with the matters contained in the notice and petition and further, that it delves into the merits which I believe that none of us possibly should entertain at the present time. I object to that line of questioning."

The judge swallowed the bait, and even directed questions to Marjorie Bond about the Jehovah's Witnesses, including this sampling:

"Q. How do you reconcile your position as not voting as a citizen of the government of which you are a member?
"A. Jesus didn't vote and he sets the example for us.

"Q. Is that one reason why you will not pledge allegiance to the flag?
"A. That is an act of worship to an image, saluting or pledging of allegiance.

"Q. Is that your interpretation of pledging allegiance to the flag, that you are worshipping the flag of the United States?
"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. And not acknowledging it as the symbol of the sovereign under which you live and breathe and have your being?
"A. Yes, sir, I know it is the symbol of the sovereign, but we owe our life to God and we breathe by God's grace and not by the laws of the lands.

"Q. Do you intend to bring [the children] up in that belief that you have just stated?
"A. Yes, sir, I do."

In April 1958, the trial court issued its decision, which stated, in part:

"The Court upon consideration of the testimony and evidence submitted herein does find that the Plaintiff, Marjorie M. Bond, did, after said divorce decree was entered awarding to her the custody of the said children and exclusive use of said residence together with all the household goods and furnishings therein to be used as a home for Plaintiff and the said children, hold and permit others to hold meetings of Jehovah's Witnesses in said home, and designated said home as a regular meeting place of said Jehovah's Witnesses, and did while said meetings were being held require said infant children to be present and in attendance at said meetings, and that said meetings sometimes continued for periods as long as three hours during which periods the said children were required to be in attendance, and that said children ranged in ages from five to nine years and while many of said meetings were being held manifested displeasure, discomfort, and nervousness; that said children were instructed in some of said meetings by said Jehovah's Witnesses in the home set apart for the Plaintiff and said children not to pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America, not to vote in matters pertaining to Government and not to bear arms in defense of their country, even if it were being attacked by a foreign power seeking to destroy or subject same to capture and ruin, to which ruling of the Court the Plaintiff objects and excepts.

"Upon consideration of the testimony taken herein the Court is of the opinion and does decree that the holding of said meetings in said residence jointly owned by the parties hereto is detrimental to the best interests and welfare of the said three children, and that by reason thereof this Court does award the injunction prayed for, to which ruling of the Court the Plaintiff objects and excepts, and it is therefore adjudged, ordered and decreed that the plaintiff, Marjorie M. Bond, be and she is hereby enjoined, restrained, and prohibited from holding, or permitting others to hold meetings of Jehovah's Witnesses in the home owned jointly by the said Plaintiff and the said Defendant at 1809 Jefferson Avenue, in the City of Huntington, Cabell County, West Virginia, to which ruling of the Court the Plaintiff objects and excepts.

"It is further adjudged, ordered and decreed, that the defendant, William J. B. Bond, Jr., be and he is hereby granted the right of visitation with the said children on Saturday of each week from six o'clock P. M. to nine o'clock P. M., at said home owned jointly by the said Plaintiff and the said Defendant or elsewhere without the said Plaintiff being present during said time or times of visitation, to which ruling of the Court the Plaintiff objects and excepts.

...

"It is further adjudged, ordered and decreed that the issues joined by the parties in the pleadings found herein do not require a decision of the Court concerning the right or rights of the Plaintiff, Marjorie M. Bond, to worship as a Jehovah's Witness, to which ruling of the Court the Plaintiff objects and excepts.

After the first level appellate court refused to hear an appeal because "the judgment was 'plainly right'", the West Virginia Supreme Court took the case. The West Virginy Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision relating to the use of the property, and affirmed the incidental issues relating to custody and support. The West Virginy Supreme Court cited at length various irrelevant 1930s and 1940s decisions in favor of the Jehovah's Witnesses in scenarios regarding schools and the Pledge of Allegiance, the military draft, child custody (not even at issue in this case), etc. Ignoring William Bond's rights as joint owner of the real property, and bringing up "custody" as an issue in a case that did not involve a custody issue, the court said:

"The husband now seeks to restrict or limit that custody. [Where did those fools get that? The only custody issue in this case was the time of Bond's visitation.] It is not shown that the children are being neglected in the usual sense; that they are abused or mistreated; or that they are subjected to any evil or immoral influence. While it appears that the home is used somewhat infrequently for small religious gatherings of Jehovah's Witnesses, it does not appear that such gatherings are characterized by loud noises, misconduct or any other sort of lack of decorum. Nor does it appear that the dwelling property is being defaced or abused. In essence, the husband displays a keen impatience with the tenets, teachings, beliefs and practices of Jehovah's Witnesses; he does not want his children reared in that religious faith; and, obviously, it is for this purpose that the defendant seeks to restrict the nature of the use the plaintiff and the infant children shall make of the home. [Did these fools stop to think that William Bond has the same constitutional rights and property rights as does his ex-wife?]

... ...

"Plaintiff occupies the home in question, not only as a joint-owner thereof, but also by court order. She has a property right therein. It is her home, in which, by court order, she is charged with the responsibility of rearing, directing, training, instructing and caring for the infant children whose custody has been committed solemnly to her care. The use she is making of the home in instructing the children in the religious belief which makes the strongest appeal to her conscience is a normal use of a home. That home is her 'castle' in the sense that this Court has no constitutional right or authority to 'cross the threshold' in order to restrain her in the free but orderly and lawful exercise of her religious freedom. ...

"For the reasons stated, this Court holds that the provisions of the decree of the Domestic Relations Court of Cabell County which are designed to restrict plaintiff in the use of her home in matters pertaining to her religious faith is in violation of the letter and spirit of Article III, Section 15 of the Constitution of West Virginia, and, for that reason, such provisions of the decree are void and unenforceable. [Again these Mountaineer judges are idiots. William Bond simply asked that the home he jointly owns, and pays for, not be used as a church. William Bond did not asked for anything that restricted his wife or children from exercising their own constitutional rights within the home.]

BATTAGLIA v. BATTAGLIA was a 1958 New York appellate court decision. Limited details only. This case evidently involved some unusual details not available to me. This custody and blood transfusion case involved the couple Mario and Valeria Battaglia of Latham, New York. Mario was a retired jockey who operated a barbershop. The year 1957 apparently was a whirlwind for this family. This couple had a newborn baby, who apparently had a medical condition which either did require, or at least presented a likelihood of requiring blood transfusions. Around the same time that Valeria Battaglia gave birth to Michael, she joined the Jehovah's Witnesses, a religion which forbade blood transfusions. Valeria Battaglia evidently attempted to keep her newborn son from receiving the necessary blood transfusions. That apparently led to this divorce and custody action between the parents.

The parents had been married in the Presbyterian Church. Baby Michael was baptized in the Presbyterian Church soon after his birth in September or October 1957. Valeria Battaglia joined the Jehovah's Witnesses soon thereafter. Mario Battaglia soon thereafter filed for divorce claiming that Valeria Battaglia was spending all her time going to Jehovah's Witnesses meetings, and doing door-to-door recruiting, rather than spending time taking care of her newborn son. Valeria Battaglia apparently moved out of the marital residence. It is unclear whether she took the newborn with her. The details regarding the need for blood transfusions for Michael, and what Valerie did to prohibit such is also unclear.

At any rate, custody of seven month old Michael was awarded to Mario Battaglia, who apparently was in his 40s, since a comment from the appellate opinion mentions that he had already reared a son from a previous marriage from infancy through college. Therafter, Valerie Battaglia appealed. In affirming the trial court's custody award, the appellate court stated in part:

"During the fall of 1957, the petitioner joined a religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses. Largely as a result of the change in petitioner's religious faith, a clash developed between the parties which led to their ultimate separation. Respondent claims that the petitioner has been absorbed by activities in her newly embraced faith, attends meetings of the sect, and engages in work for it, as a result of which she has allegedly neglected the child.

"Respondent has also contended that one of the tenets of Jehovah's Witnesses bars blood transfusions, however essential such device may be deemed by medical experts. He has claimed that petitioner would not permit a blood transfusion for the child even though the child's life might be thereby saved, and further contends that the sect accepts the principle that the death of the child constitutes 'saving the child'.

"Petitioner, of course, enjoys her constitutional right to freedom of religion and may practice the religious faith of her choice without interference. She has not, however, the right to impose upon an innocent child the hazards to it flowing from her own religious convictions. The welfare of the child is paramount. If medical science requires a blood transfusion to preserve the child's life, the child should not be deprived of life because the mother's religious persuasion opposes such transfusion.

"The child has a right to survival and a chance to live and the court has a duty to extend its protecting arm to the child. It is of no concern to the court what religious preference the parents may elect. The best interests of the child are the primary concern in all custody conflicts and not the desires of either the mother or father. In this case, the father has demonstrated great interest in and affection for the child. He has previously had the custody of an infant son from a prior marriage, whom he has reared and who is now a college student. ... "

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RAGAN v. RAGAN was a 1958 Missouri appellate court decision. Famous WatchTower Society attorney, and former WatchTower Vice-President, Hayden C. Covington represented Agnes Vernie Ragan in this appeal, which Covington lost. With regard to Covington's representation on appeal, the very last paragraph in this lengthy appellate opinion is a nice place to start this summary:

"Since plaintiff properly raised no constitutional question in the trial court and properly presented no such question in this court, we have neither reason nor excuse to accept the invitation of plaintiff's counsel to browse through the judicial pastures of other jurisdictions from California to New Hampshire for examination of cases involving the [Jehovah's] Witnesses and their doctrines. Nevertheless, with freedom of religion so basic to our way of life and so cherished by all free people, we would deem it a duty and count it a privilege to deal with plaintiff's purported point in the exercise of our discretionary power to consider 'plain errors affecting substantial rights' under Supreme Court Rule 3.27, if plaintiff's constitutional guaranties of freedom of religion had been denied by the judgment under review. However, we can discover no basis for plaintiff's charge that the decree nisi was based upon her religious beliefs and practices. On the contrary, the record shows that every objection of plaintiff's counsel to inquiries concerning those matters was sustained by the trial judge, who in some instances pointedly commented that such inquiries were not material or relevant. There was ample evidence to justify and support the award of custody of the two children to defendant, wholly disregarding plaintiff's religious beliefs and practices, and certainly our affirmation of the decree nisi, upon review de novo, is in no wise and to no extent predicated upon or influenced by any religious consideration. The simple truth is that there has been and is no constitutional question in this case.

Elmer Lee Ragan and Agnes Vernie Ragan were married in 1931. In addition to an 8 year old daughter and a 5 year old son, the Ragans also had two sons who were adults by the year 1957. The Ragan family lived in Fordland, Missouri, where they operated a grocery and farm supply business out of the same building in which they lived.

In October 1955, Agnes Vernie Ragan joined the Jehovah's Witnesses. In May 1956, she left her husband and children, and thereafter remained separate and apart from them until October 1956, when the family was briefly reunited. During this period of separation, Agnes Ragan engaged in the Jehovah's Witnesses "missionary work" of "placing literature". She also found time to pursue two lawsuits seeking financial support from her husband.

When the second such lawsuit came on for trial in October 1956, the circuit judge, distressed by the tragedy unfolding before him, patiently talked with the parties in his chambers, persuasively urged them to reunite "for the sake of the children," and hopefully effected what we shall refer to as a reconciliation. At that time, the parties entered into an informal "agreement" that (as paraphrased by Agnes Ragan in its simplest terms): "I was to take care of the home and the children, and he (Elmer Ragan) was to take care of the business." According to Agnes Ragan, the specific provision that (as she put it) "I was to have no part in the business" was prompted by her complaint about working long hours in the store.

However, Elmer Ragan said that he insisted upon this provision because of Agnes Ragan's secret and unauthorized abstractions of cash from the store: "I couldn't trust her in the store no more." Per the "agreement", Agnes Ragan was to attend two meetings of the Jehovah's Witnesses each week, a one-hour meeting for "Bible study" each Tuesday evening at a farm home two miles from Fordland, and a two-hour meeting each Sunday evening at Kingdom Hall in Springfield, but was not to participate otherwise in the Jehovah's Witnesses' "activities," which Elmer Ragan charged had caused Agnes Ragan to neglect and abandon both her husband and their children.

This "reconciliation" was short-lived. Within 2-3 weeks, tempers flared and trouble erupted again, by reason of Agnes Ragan's alleged failure to come home immediately after the meetings ended. Instead, she allegedly was not coming home until 11:00 o'clock or later on several nights. Additionally, Elmer Ragan alleged that during the period from the reconciliation in October to the final separation on January 20, 1957, Agnes Ragan's mind was so occupied and her time was so consumed with the reading of WatchTower literature and activities that she failed to dress and feed the children properly, frequently left them "just running wild around the store" - "just doing whatever they wanted to do," and was so unconcerned about them that she "many a time" answered his inquiries about the children with "I don't know - go see about them"; that she would not engage in conversation
without bringing up the Jehovah's Witnesses and attempting to answer every question "with scripture". Further, Agnes Ragan spoke disparagingly of "anyone by the name of Ragan" in general and of her husband in particular, because, not being Jehovah's Witnesses, they were "no ways near the same type and kind of people" but were "an altogether different class or breed"; that she told the children that, "if they listened to me (their father), it was wrong and lie"; and that, in short, she was "very cold and indifferent" - "a long ways from a wife" to defendant and not "motherly with the children."

On an evening in November, 1956, Elmer Ragan waited up until 10:30P.M. for Agnes to return from her meeting, "went on to bed," heard no knock or telephone call, and did not see Agnes until she returned home the following morning, when Agnes curtly remarked: "I would have been at home if you would have let me in". Agnes gave no explanation of where she had spent the night. During the trial, Agnes testified that she had "returned a little after ten," that there had been no response to her knocks on the locked door or to her call from the nearby telephone exchange, and that accordingly she had sought lodging for the night with neighbors of the same religious faith.

The final separation followed an altercation on the night of Sunday, January 20, 1957, after plaintiff had returned from Springfield "around 10:30 or a little after." According to Elmer Ragan, he was upstairs putting the two minor children to bed, when Agnes knocked on the downstairs door. Probably taking his good time, by the time he went downstairs to let Agnes in, she was beating and kicking the door. After that point, both parties gave widely different versions of the multiple physical attacks both probably made on each other. Interestingly, the then 18 year old son testified in Elmer's favor. At any rate, Agnes left the marital home permanently that night.

At trial, Elmer Ragan, and others testified that Agnes Ragan had a bad temper. The then 19 year old son testified that his mother "was always abusive" toward his father and "was always in a mad state of condition." Two neighbor women related separate conversations with Agnes in which Agnes had admitted that "when she (Agnes) got mad there wasn't nothing she wouldn't say or do." According to Elmer, Agnes "would hardly ever just talk" to the children - "she would slap them, kick them first, and then tell them what she wanted." Both Elmer and son Don described an illustrative incident involving Robert Keith, the five-year old child. "Little Bobby set a water pitcher at the table, and didn't set it on there good, and it fell off, and she just screamed and said, 'you little devil,' and kicked him and cried and so forth for about an hour or more and slapped him a time or two because the kid made a mistake." In describing his mother's reaction to the broken pitcher, Don said that she "had a sort of a screaming fit, and kicked him (Bobby), and went into a mad rage." An employee who worked at the Ragan store, testified that he had seen plaintiff "kick the children in the stomach, in the back" - "almost anyplace, it didn't make much difference, I don't think."

Three neighbor women staunchly supported Elmer Ragan's assertion that Agnes had neglected the children. Two of these neighbors had seen the young Ragan children playing on a nearby railroad right of way several times and had sent them home, and the third neighbor recounted an incident in which she "went and got Bobby (5 years old at time of trial) off the highway and a big truck just barely missed him." All of this occurred while Agnes was at home. Nine witnesses for Elmer testified that the children had better care while Agnes was gone from May to October 1956, and after the final separation in January 1957, than while she was at home. Agnes also had six "witnesses" testify on her behalf, but as the trial judge noted, "not a single witness testified on her behalf on the all-important issue as to her care of the children."

More interesting was the testimony of three other local residents who all knew Elmer and Agnes. One man testified that he had seen Agnes and an unidentified "somebody" drinking beer at a Springfield bar. A woman testified that was returning from church between 10:00 and 10:30 P. M. on a Sunday night during December, 1956, when she came upon a parked, unlighted automobile stopped in the middle of a lonely road. Fearful that she could not pass this parked automobile, she "got out of my car and walked to the window" of the parked automobile for the purpose of asking the driver to move. She smelled "liquor or beer," and saw Agnes and an unidentified man in the parked automobile, spoke to Agnes by name, and received an answering "hello." Another local man testified that "around three or four weeks" prior to the trial on June 3, 1957, he was driving over a dirt road near Springfield, between 11:30 P.M. and midnight, when the headlights on his slowly-moving automobile shone on a parked, unlighted automobile, facing toward him. "I seen Agnes in it, and I thought Elmer might have been there too, so I stopped and went up to the car, and I seen it wasn't Elmer, and just spoke to Agnes, and just turned around and walked back to my car, and took off."

The appellate judges who heard this case could barely contain their despise for the LIES of WatchTower Attorney and Vice-President Hayden Covington. Note this paragraph from the appellate opinion:

"The tenor of plaintiff's argument on appeal is exemplified by these bold, sweeping affirmations in the opening paragraph:

'There is not the slightest suggestion that [Agnes Ragan] was guilty of any immorality. The record nowhere even faintly suggests that she did not properly care for her children. The evidence shows that she was diligent in providing them with religious guidance. Nowhere can it be found in the record that she neglected her children.'

On this false premise (asserted in the teeth of a record fairly bristling with testimony to the contrary), plaintiff contends that, while 'both parties were qualified' to have custody of the children, 'lack of proof of disqualification made mandatory the award to the mother.' But, sound and fury are sorry substitutes for fact and evidence, and plaintiff's counsel cannot, by his own bootstraps, lift himself and his client above the transcript here presented. Although our courts have said many times that, "all other things being equal," custody of a child of tender years should be awarded to the mother ... , the paramount and controlling consideration in every child custody case, to which all other principles and presumptions must yield, is the welfare of the child.

"In the homely language of the old adage, "the proof of the pudding is in the eating"; ... And, upon our independent and painstaking review of the entire record in the instant case ... with primary concern for the welfare of the children involved ..., we are convinced beyond peradventure of doubt that the judgment of the trial court, awarding custody of the two children to [Elmer Ragan], was justified and proper, finds ample support in the evidence, and should not be disturbed."

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MILLER v. HEDRICK was a 1958 California appellate child custody case which involved a Jehovah's Witness husband, named Dorsey Marlin Miller, and his Catholic ex-spouse, named Mary Hedrick. Limited details. Parties were married in 1951, and a son, Stephen Miller, was born 1952-3. Wife went to Nevada in October 1953 to obtain a divorce, which granted her custody, with Miller receiving visitation and responsibility to pay $15 per week child support. Wife subsequently resumed living in California, and remarried.

Although unclear, Miller may have converted to the Jehovah's Witnesses after the divorce, since the parties did not have troubles until some later point in time when Miller began to train Stephen as a JW, including taking him to meetings at a Kingdom Hall, and also out in door-to-door recruiting. At that point, Hedrick stopped permitting the previously allowed overnight and over-weekends visitation, and even threatened to move to Texas with the child.

Thereafter, Miller began this action challenging the validity of the Nevada divorce, the amount of child support, his right to expose the child to JW teachings, etc. Outcome unknown.

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JACKSON v. JACKSON was a 1957 Kansas Supreme Court decision, which involved Leon Jackson, of Richfield, Kansas, and Vena Irene Jackson French, who apparently relocated to Amarillo, Texas, after remarrying a JW. Famous WatchTower Society Attorney Hayden C. Covington represented the wife. Hayden C. Covington won this one. Limited details.

Leon Jackson filed for divorce against Vena French. On French's cross petition, she was awarded a divorce from Jackson, a division of the property, and the care, custody and control of the three minor children; Stephen age 7, James age 5, and Dianne age 3. After Vena French converted to the Jehovah's Witnesses, and began to convert the children, Leon Jackson sought custody. The Kansas district court granted custody to Leon Jackson after ruling that Vena French was "emotionally unstable".

Vena French appealed. Hayden Covington argued that the trial court had violated French's constitutionally protected right to freedom of religion. The Kansas Supreme Court agreed, stating in part:

"... the question of religion cannot be regarded by the court in determining the care, custody and control of minor children. The courts have no authority over that part of a child's training which consists in religious discipline, and in a dispute relating to custody, religious views afford no ground for depriving a parent of custody who is otherwise qualified.

" ... Religious freedom, as guaranteed by our Constitution, should be faithfully upheld, and religious teachings to the children by a parent or parents, regardless of how obnoxious the same might be to the Court, the other parent or the general public should not and must not be considered as basis of making child custody orders."

A well reasoned dissent argued that if a custodial parent's religious views and activities, constitutionally protected or not, were such as to result in "emotional instability" of the custodial parent, the trial court had not only the right, but the duty, to take such fact into consideration in determining what was in the best interests and welfare of the children.

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TAYLOR v. TAYLOR was a 1957 Iowa court decision. In 1956, Carol J. Taylor, of Mason City, Iowa, sued for divorce her Jehovah's Witness husband, Obie D. Taylor, of Gilmore City, Iowa, on grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment. The Taylors had been married since 1951, and had separated in July 1956. The divorce was denied. Specifically, Taylor alleged that her JW husband continuously attempted to convert her to the WatchTower religion, which she opposed. It is apparent that Taylor's attorney did an extremely poor job of presenting the evidence of the constant strain that such placed on Carol Taylor's mental health, which she testified was suffering. The 1951 judge relied on lack of verbal abuse and physical violence for his denial.

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NICHOLS v. NICHOLS was a 1956-7 Missouri divorce case. Eausaw Nichols and Lucille Nichols were married in 1946. In 1956, Lucille Nichols separated from her JW Husband and filed for a divorce. Lucille Nichols complained that she was blind, and that despite the fact that she depended on her husband for certain daily needs, that Eausaw Nichols had repeatedly left her home alone for extended periods of time in order to attend WatchTower Conventions in distant cities such as NYC, Chicago, etc. The couple apparently had no children, nor relatives who lived nearby, which forced Lucille Nichols to obtain help from neighbors or whomever she could. Lucille Nichols had no intention of converting to the JWs, nor attending WatchTower Conventions and meetings with her husband, so she sought this divorce. The judge agreed, and granted her request. Eausaw Nichols did not even bother to show up for the trial.

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THOMAS v. THOMAS was a 1956 Missouri appellate decision. Famous WatchTower Society attorney, and former WatchTower Vice-President, Hayden C. Covington represented Lillian June Thomas in this appeal.

Willard B. Thomas and Lillian June Thomas were married in October, 1945, after Willard Thomas was discharged from the United States Navy at the end of World War II. Willard received a small disability pension due to injuries received in the war. Lillian June Thomas had been married before, and she had a 3 year old son. Lillian's ex-husband paid no child support, and Lillian did not work outside the home. In 1946, Willard bought and paid for a home in St. Joseph, Missouri with savings bonds he had purchased during the war. Two sons were born to the couple.

The couple lived together amicably until July 1950, when Lillian June Thomas joined the Jehovah's Witnesses. After joining the Jehovah's Witnesses, her religion became Lillian's priority. She went from house to house distributing pamphlets and preaching the doctrines of the WatchTower Society; sometimes taking the couple's children with her. She, sometimes accompanied by one or more children, distributed pamphlets on the streets of St. Joseph. She attended meetings of Jehovah's Witnesses at Kingdom Hall in St. Joseph. She had attended four WatchTower Conventions held in other cities. Additionally, Lillian took the couple's children to the meetings of the Jehovah's Witnesses, and she was training them to believe and act as Jehovah's Witnesses.

Around the same time Lillian joined the Jehovah's Witnesses, Willard began to work as a police officer in St. Joseph. Willard did not believe in the doctrines of Jehovah's Witnesses. He also was opposed to having his children taught WatchTower doctrines. He objected to the influence exercised by Lillian over his children in getting them to accept WatchTower interpretations, particularly as such pertained to saluting the American flag. Willard requested Lillian not to teach WatchTower doctrines to their children, but she continued to do so. There was quarreling in the family as the result of this difference of opinion.

In September 1954, Willard had had enough, and he moved out of the marital residence. He moved in with his parents in St. Joseph, where he later also brought his youngest son. The older son evidently refused to live with him. Willard filed for divorce that same month, and the case was tried in late October, 1954. The trial court granted Willard a divorce, and awarded him the general custody of both of his natural children. Lillian received visitations every Saturday-Sunday, and the right to visit the children at all reasonable times. Her motion for a new trial was overruled, and she appealed.

At trial, Willard testified:

"Q. How many hours during the day or week would she be absent from your home in connection with this religious matter?

A. Three or four times a week from half a day to a full day. She stated that sometimes she had been over in Kansas recruiting members, other times here in town getting in her hours. Usually she went on Sunday evening, Tuesday evening and Friday evening. That was meeting night. She stated she went down there. Where she went I don't know but she was gone mostly every Sunday, Tuesday and Friday evening from 7:00 until almost midnight.

"Q. What about the children?

A. When I was there I would keep them. ... I would take care of them when I was working the midnight to morning shift. When I was working 4:00 to 12:00 she took them with her ... .

"Q. And that continued for a number of years?

A. That is right ... . When I was working 4:00 to 12:00 I didn't know where she went. She said she went to the hall ... . I drove past there several times and I saw her in the hall several times. ... Sometimes she missed and didn't go out but may be once or twice during the week, but she was pretty determined and she made it most of the time."

Lillian testified that she only averaged about two hours per week doing literature distribution. She also testified that she attended one-hour and two-hour meetings at the Kingdom Hall on Tuesday night, Friday night and Sunday evenings. Willard had testified that: "Three or four times a week she wasn't there to prepare my meals. I never knew when I went home whether she would be there or not. Lillian countered: "When I knew that he was coming home ... I was always there" to prepare his meals".

Willard testified that he performed his duties as a husband and father to the best of his ability; that he supported his stepson, Gary, for nine years; that he paid all of the household and family expenses; that he paid all of the bills because defendant "never had time, she said, to pay them"; that he paid for "her makeup and everything else"; and that he gave defendant $6 every two weeks "to spend on whatever she wanted"; that after they moved into the house on South 11th Street, he bought all of the groceries and carried them home. Willard testified that Lillian had a charge account at a local dry goods store, for which he paid the bill.

Lillian testified that her Jehovah's Witnesses friends had to give her used clothing. She testified that Willard gave her only $3 every two weeks until she threatened to stop washing and ironing his clothes. She demanded the $6 every two weeks to do so. She further testified that Willard forbade her to draw any money out of the bank without his permission: "If I had I would have gotten a beating." [Uh, then why didn't he beat you for not washing and ironing his clothes?]

Willard testified that on many occasions Lillian cursed him and called him vile names. She called him "an unbelieving son of a bitch atheist", even though Willard was not an atheist. Willard testified: "She kept telling [the children] that I was no good, because I carried a gun. ... My boy ... eight years old told me many times, 'You are no good, you carry a gun.'" Lillian denied everything.

Both parties testified "he said - she said" to an incident over Willard's alleged taking of money Lillian had earned selling berries, which she planned to use to travel to a WatchTower Convention.

Willard testified to an incident when his dad, mother and sister were visiting on one of Lillian's meeting nights. Lillian started to her meeting, but then returned to the living room, and said, "I am tired of your damned relations here. ... I don't want any unbelievers here that don't believe in Jehovah's Witnesses." Lillian told Willard's sister: "You, I hate more than any." Lillian then lunged at the sister, and Willard grabbed her to prevent a fight. Willard said his family never visited in his home again. Willard's family all testified to the incident, and Lillian didn't even bother to deny it.

Willard testified that when the Star Spangled Banner was played on the television, "She started beating on pans and booing, and most of the time jerked the plug out of the wall. ... She would grab [the children] and take them in the other room." She said that the television set was the work of Satan. Every time a preacher or a Catholic priest came on, or the flag was shown, she would turn it off or yank the plug out.

In July 1953, Willard took the family on a road trip to Yellowstone National Park. Lillian was a pain on the trip because she had wanted to attend a WatchTower Convention in New York City, instead. She also complained about the trip to Colorado Springs the next summer.

The night Willard moved out in September 1954, the couple had a physical altercation after Lillian came home from a meeting at around 10:00PM. Both parties gave widely different versions of the incident. Lillian also testified to numerous other occasions in which she alleged that Willard struck her. She also testified to numerous times of being cursed at and called bad names. The oldest son testified in support of Lillian. Willard denied most of such. There were many other charges and counter-charges, and denials by each as accused. Several of Lillian's Jehovah's Witnesses friends testified on her behalf, while Willard's police chief and neighbor testified on his behalf.

On appeal, prepared by Hayden Covington, Lillian contended that "upon a review of the whole record this court should reach the conclusion that defendant was entitled to the divorce and the plaintiff was not entitled thereto"; that "the court abused its discretion when custody of the minor children was awarded to the plaintiff"; and that "the judgment of the court below denied defendant her right of freedom of worship and of religion, contrary to Article 1, Section 5 of the Constitution of Missouri and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution." They further contended that the "sole basis of the decree of divorce was that defendant left the house 'whenever she felt like it andover the protest of her husband' to worship Almighty God Jehovah"; and that "the record in this case shows that the only reason the children were taken away from defendant was that of her religion"; and consequently that the judgment appealed from denied defendant her constitutional "rights of freedom of worship and of religion".

The appellate court first nixed Covington's constitutional violation claims pointing out that no such type claim had been made at trial for their review. The court went on to affirm the trial court's ruling, stating in part:

"While each divorce action based on alleged general indignities must be determined on its own facts, the courts have said repeatedly that indignities, such as to warrant the granting of a divorce, ordinarily must amount to a continuous course of conduct. A single act, or occasional acts, will not suffice. The acts relied upon must amount to a species of mental cruelty, and must evidence a course of conduct by one of the parties toward the other whereby the other's condition is rendered intolerable through acts of such character and frequency as to be subversive of the family relation. ...

"In the case at bar there was a direct conflict in the testimony on almost every charge and countercharge. If plaintiff's evidence be accepted as true, he was entitled to a decree of divorce. Plaintiff's evidence, as a whole, was substantial. It disclosed a course of conduct on defendant's part extending over a period of about four years, the cumulative effect of which may well have rendered plaintiff's condition intolerable. It is our duty, of course, to review the whole record and reach our own conclusions in divorce cases, but where, as here, the decision depends largely upon the credibility of the witness, we must give due deference to the conclusions of the trial judge who saw and heard all of the witnesses, and we are not authorized to set aside the judgment unless clearly erroneous. ... Applying this rule, we defer to the conclusion of the trial court that plaintiff was the innocent and injured party and therefore entitled to a decree of divorce.

"We turn to defendant's contention that the court erred in awarding the custody of the parties' children to plaintiff. As stated, after the separation plaintiff took the younger boy, Stephen, to the home of plaintiff's parents and Stephen has been living there since that time. Plaintiff's mother testified that she was employed 'in the daytime' at 'Montgomery-Ward'; that her husband did not work and was at home 'all the time'; and that plaintiff always stayed at home with Stephen when he was not on duty. Plaintiff testified that he was living with his parents; that their home was a modern six-room house with three bedrooms, located a block and a half from Webster School; that if he were awarded the custody of the children they would be 'properly supervised and have all their care and affection, and one of us will be with them at all times'; that his mother had been taking Stephen to Sunday School at the Second Presbyterian Church; that his mother was a member of a church at Halleck, Missouri, and about ten miles from St. Joseph; that when he was a boy he attended services at a Presbyterian Church; that when he was in the Navy he attended church services every Sunday, and continued: 'I study the Bible but I haven't been attending church.' As we have seen, at the time of the trial, defendant, Gary and the parties' older son, Dennis Michael, were living in the home at 3738 South 11th Street. Defendant testified that if she were awarded the custody of the parties' children she would need money for their support, and that she 'could get a job very easy'. She did not say who would care for the children when she was working.

"Defendant insists that the best interests of a child of tender years requires that it be placed in the custody of its mother. Ordinarily, as between the father and mother, the mother will be awarded the custody of such a child unless it be shown that she is unfit to take charge of the child or that she cannot provide it with a suitable home. It is well settled, however, that 'the findings of the trial court in matters involving the custody of a minor child of divorced parents, while not binding upon the appellate court which must review the record for itself, are nevertheless not to be lightly disturbed, and will be deferred to unless the appellate court is firmly convinced that the welfare of the child requires some other disposition.' ... Under the record in this case, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the custody of the children to plaintiff."