|
|
DIVORCE, BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS, AND
OTHER LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING
CHILDREN OF JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES
There is no such thing as a "national child custody law". Although similar, each state's legislature has established its own state laws regarding child custody, and each state's courts interpret those laws using legal standards that may vary from that used by courts in other states.
As site visitors will quickly see from reading the following summaries, state courts currently apply one of the following three different legal standards when deciding these cases:
1. Actual Or Substantial Harm: Existing actual or substantial harm to the child must be proven to have been caused by a parent's religious practices before the court will restrict that parent's constitutional rights. Such states include California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont and Washington.
2. Risk Of Harm. For a court to restrict a parent's constitutional rights, it only has to be proven that that a parent's religious practices pose a risk of harm to the child. Such states include Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina and Pennsylvania.
3. No Harm Required. In only a few states, such as Arkansas and Wisconsin, a parent who has sole legal custody also has the exclusive right to determine the child's religious education.
Child custody court case decisions are typically lengthy and complex, and tyically deal with a multitude of legal issues. The following case summaries will generally include only with those issues in which the WatchTower/Jehovah's Witness religion was a factor. Some summaries may omit one or more issues relevant to the court's final decision(s), but not deemed relevant to the theme of this website.
**************
1960s COURT DECISIONS
**************
"2. The religious zeal of a spouse may be carried to such lengths that domestic harmony is completely disrupted and the legitimate ends of matrimony destroyed, with the result that the life of the complaining spouse is rendered intolerable. Such conduct characterizes behavior amounting to extreme cruelty and also may constitute gross neglect of duty within the purview of our divorce statute ... ...."4. The paramount consideration of the court in custody cases between parents is the welfare and best interests of the children. In the absence of abuse of sound judicial discretion the trial court's determination of custody will be upheld on appeal."5. The record is examined in a divorce action where the wife became so obsessed with her religious beliefs and activities as a Jehovah's Witness that her conduct competely disrupted family life and she neglected her duties as a wife and mother, and it is held, the trial court did not err in (1) granting the husband a divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty and gross neglect of duty; (2) the division of property and alimony award; and (3) awarding custody of the minor children to the husband."
**************
**************
McDANIEL v. McDANIEL was a 1968 Ohio appellate court decision. James McDaniel and Deloris McDaniel were divorced in the early 1960s. Deloris McDaniel received custody of their daughter, Jolene Kay McDaniel. At some point, James McDaniel both remarried and converted to the Jehovah's Witnesses. James McDaniel then sought custody of Jolene McDaniel. At the 1967 hearing, James McDaniel attacked Deloris McDaniel's fitness as a parent, while Deloris McDaniel made much adoo about James McDaniel's new religion. James McDaniel's petition for custody was denied at the local trial and local appellate levels, and then denied at the interim appellate level. Further appeals and outcome unknown.
**************
"[Clair Meredith] is teaching his boys in accordance with the tenets of his [Jehovah's Witnesses] religion not to salute the flag, and that it is better to go to jail than to serve the country or participate in elections and support the country's institutions."
"If this were the only ground upon which the trial court had found and concluded appellant was an unfit party for the custody of his minor children, it appears the great weight of authority in other jurisdictions would require reversal of the trial court's decree and a new trial. ..."However, there was competent evidence in the record before us that appellant was guilty of incestuous conduct with an older daughter from a prior marriage who had been living with appellant and the two boys of this marriage during the separation of the parties hereto. The record also contains competent evidence that appellant requested and desired having anal intercourse with respondent. Additionally the evidence discloses that this older daughter by the prior marriage who for years served as a baby sitter for appellant with the two boys, the custody of whom are involved here was married and had left the home some six months prior to the date of the trial. The record fails to disclose what care appellant would provide for the two minor boys when he absented himself from the home in his religious endeavors. It is true that the abnormal sexual habits of appellant were denied, but it has long been the rule of this court that where the findings of fact of the trial court are supported by substantial, competent, though conflicting, evidence such findings will not be disturbed on appeal. ...... ..."While respondent's conduct left much to be desired, still the trial court found, and the record amply supports the finding, that her misconduct was caused by appellant's complete devotion to his religion to the exclusion of his family and that at the time of the trial respondent had reformed. Also it is to be noted that the misconduct on the part of the respondent, relied upon by appellant, was from months to years prior to the date of the hearing; and there was no showing of her unfitness as a mother at the time of the trial.
"Thus there is no showing of an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in awarding custody of these minor children of tender years to respondent-mother.
... ..."Next, appellant contends the court erred in permitting evidence concerning appellant's religion to be introduced on the questions (1) of determining his fitness for custody of the children, and (2) in considering respondent's grounds for divorce, claiming in each instance that appellant's constitutional rights were infringed under the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Article 1, section 4 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho. There was no reversible error committed by the admission of such evidence in determining appellant's fitness for custody of the children because, as previously pointed out in this opinion, the evidence supports the trial court's findings and conclusions in this respect on other grounds. There was no error in the admission of such evidence in support of respondent's grounds for divorce because, as she testified, and as the court found, it was appellant's total absorption with his religion that primarily caused the disruption of the parties' marriage."
"The basic issue, in the view of this court, is whether the children are being so adversely affected by their continued education in a Catholic school while continuing to live with a mother, who is a Jehovah's Witness, that they should be removed from the custody and care of their mother. The facts are clear that the mother is a good mother, providing a good and clean home and that the father is a devoted father, equally concerned about the welfare of the children. Were there no difference in the religion of the parents, the likelihood of a fairly stable, normal family relationship might have been good.
"The difficulty seems to be compounded by the fact that the mother, aged 31, born in Italy and raised in the Catholic faith, who married her husband in the Catholic Church, has only within the last three years become a practicing Jehovah's Witness. The children had all been baptized in the Catholic Church and the older two children now attend a Catholic school, although the oldest child did attend a public school in the first grade and the second child attended kindergarten in a public school.
"The mother admits that she would prefer to bring her children up as Jehovah's Witnesses but did testify that she felt, as a Jehovah's Witness, that the father did have the right to decide what kind of education the children should have. Thus she agrees that, if the father wishes the children to attend a Catholic school and to attend Catholic Church, she will allow them to do so. She states that she tries to help her children with their lessons in all but their religious subjects. Yet she feels she has the right to express to the children her feelings, as a Jehovah's Witness, that the Catholic religion 'is not based on the Bible'. She admits taking the children at times to Kingdom Hall, the headquarters and meeting room of Jehovah's Witnesses, once in spite of the court's oral admonition not to do so.
"It is also true that when the court, in chambers, discussed the situation with the oldest child, aged 9, in the presence of counsel for both parties, he indicated he wishes to be brought up as a Catholic and that he was somewhat confused by the fact that his mother practiced another religion. I do not feel, however, that this is all-controlling in view of the age of the boy and in view of the boy's statement that he and his father had discussed the expected interview with me. (He did say he had been told to tell the truth). ..."There is no question that the mother had the right to change her religion and to practice her religion. Nor is there any question that Jehovah's Witnesses have a moral and legal right to bear children and to raise them in the precepts of their religion. Those who are not Jehovah's Witnesses will, of course, not agree with their beliefs and practices. They may be appalled, as is the father in this case, by their attitudes toward such matters as refusing to salute the flag, to hold public office, to serve in the armed forces or even to permit blood transfusion. But no one would suggest that where the spouses are both Jehovah's Witnesses that they should be denied the right to bring up their children as Jehovah's Witnesses, even if their beliefs are distasteful to us. Thus, a mother's being a Jehovah's Witness is no bar, in and of itself, to having custody of her children. And in this case, there is no evidence to suggest her unfitness as a mother.
"The question does arise about the effect upon the children of the conflict presented by their continuing to attend Catholic school and being brought up as Catholics in spite of the mother's difference in religion. The general rule is that the parent having custody will, absent special circumstances, be allowed to raise the children in his or her own religion. In this case the mother has agreed that the children may continue to attend Catholic school and may go to Catholic Church. There are many instances of intermarriage in which the children are brought up in a faith other than that of one of the parents, in which the relationship remains a good, healthy one. This is dependent largely upon the willingness and understanding of each parent to respect the right of the other parent to be what he or she wishes to be. It is helpful if the child is taught to respect the religious difference of the other parent and to recognize that, regardless of differences, there may be good in the heart and soul and deeds of those who believe differently than we do. This is particularly so where it is one's mother or father whose faith is different, as is her or his right in our democratic way of life.
"This does not imply that we do not recognize the inherent difficulties in a situation such as this. It will not be easy for the children to reconcile the teachings of the Catholic Church with the attitude of their mother. The mother should try to understand that this is so and should attempt to treat with respect the religious differences of the father and her children, especially since she agrees that the father has the right to determine the nature of their schooling.
"Yet I feel that the choice must be in favor of allowing the children to remain with their mother. The alternative of having them live with their father's brother and sister-in-law, the very same people who initiated the eviction action against the mother, is not a good one. Nor is there any other better plan available. ..."Custody is awarded to the mother under the following conditions, violation of any one of which may be a basis for reconsideration of this determination:"(1) The father may visit with children on Sundays from 8:30 A.M. to 12 noon, for the purpose of taking them to Catholic Church.
"(2) The father may visit with the children, in or out of the mother's home, on Saturdays from 9:00 A.M. to 1:00 P.M.
"(3) The father may take the children of school age to Catholic school every morning and he shall return them to the mother's home directly after school.
"(4) The mother shall not take the children to any headquarters or meeting hall of Jehovah's Witnesses nor shall she instruct them in any teachings of Jehovah's Witnesses.
"Mutual order of protection for one year to incorporate above conditions.
"Referred to Probation Department to discuss with the parents the possible referral for counselling around the above problems in relation to the attitudes of the parents and for any help which the children may need.
The appellant, William Alfred Reagan, filed a petition for divorce against his wife, Ester Naoma Reagan, in October, 1963, alleging as ground for divorce that she had wilfully deserted him in December, 1960, and has continued such desertion since that time. The defendant wife, appellee here, filed an answer and cross action which, as amended, denied the desertion of appellant by her and alleged wilful desertion of her on the part of appellant since January, 1961, and prayed for alimony and for a divorce. This action has been tried once before and this is the third appearance of this case before this court. On the first trial the jury returned a verdict granting both parties a divorce and awarding alimony to Mrs. Reagan. In Reagan v. Reagan [1] ... this court held that such verdict was inconsistent in view of the pleadings and evidence and ordered a retrial of the case. In Reagan v. Reagan [2] ... this court held that the new trial previously ordered by the court rendered defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict a nullity and ordered the court to dismiss the motion.On the retrial of the case, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the appellee for divorce and awarded her alimony. The trial court entered judgment and decree on the verdict and also awarded appellee $750 as attorney's fees. The appeal is from that judgment on assignments of error stated hereafter.... ...We hold that there was evidence to support the verdict in favor of the wife on the question of desertion by her husband. It appears from the evidence that a controversy over religion between the parties had led to their separation. The wife had become a follower of a religious group known as the Jehovah's Witnesses. Her husband had long been a member of the Methodist Church in Rome, Ga. The wife testified as to the events immediately preceding the alleged abandonment and desertion of her by the appellant as follows: "Well, we had a wonderful dinner. He had gone to the Methodist Church, and our meetings are in the afternoon; and I had dinner ready for him when he came in, and we ate dinner. And I always study my Bible before I go to church, to the meetings. And he was playing solitaire in the living room, and I went in there and took my Bible down, and he began, 'Why are you reading that stuff,' and so on, and 'You are going crazy.' And finally he got so mad, he said if I ever went again that he would be gone when I got home. So I calmly said, 'Well I'm going this afternoon.' So when I got home he was gone, and has been gone ever since." She testified that he left on a Sunday late in January of 1961; that appellant moved back in to the upstairs apartment in their house after about three months; that during this time he did not communicate with her or make an attempt at reconciliation but that be came and got his clothes from her on two occasions. She further testified that she left the home of the parties on November 13, 1961 to take a job helping an elderly woman in her home with the intention of staying there only until Christmas, but that she has remained at this job ever since and appellant rented the apartment she had vacated after she left. She testified and appellant confirmed the fact that she had left a considerable amount of her clothes and personal items in the apartment which was rented to others by her husband with these clothes and items still there as she had left them.The husband testified that he had left Mrs. Reagan and stayed in a hotel for about six to eight weeks "Because I was about to go crazy. She was running me crazy talking about that Jehovah thing to me all night long. I couldn't sleep--I couldn't sleep, and I had to get somewhere where I could rest a little, so I could work." He stated that he had never left her with the intention of staying away forever. It appeared that when he moved back home into the upstairs apartment, Mrs. Reagan had the key to the downstairs apartment where she was staying and kept it locked most of the time. There was further testimony by him to the effect that he tried to effect a reconciliation and get Mrs. Reagan to come back to him. This was contradicted by Mrs. Reagan and by testimony of a married daughter of the parties, Mrs. Buck Ransom. Another married daughter, Mrs. Tom Sumerour, testified that Mr. Reagan had never asked her for Mrs. Reagan's address and this directly refuted the testimony of the appellant.In conclusion, there is evidence which, although in conflict in some particulars, is sufficient to support the verdict in favor of the wife. The jury was authorized under the evidence to find that appellant left Mrs. Reagan, that he intended to desert her, that he acted without justification and that cohabitation was not resumed and that the desertion continued for a period of at least one year. Furthermore, even if the jury believed that appellant had offered to resume marital relations and that appellee had refused to do so, the verdict would be proper under the ruling in Born v. Born, ... that "the questions of good faith on the part of the husband in making the offer and whether the refusal of the wife to resume marital relations was justified or not under the circumstances and the period of time when the desertion began, are all for the determination of the jury and cannot be resolved on demurrer."2. The second assignment of error is upon the admission by the court, over the objection of the appellant, of the testimony of the wife that she had a will leaving all she had to her children, and that it was her intention on her death to leave what she had to her children. It appears that the court sustained appellant's objection to the wife's reference to her will on the ground that the will itself was the highest and best evidence of its contents, but permitted her to testify as to what her intention was with reference to disposing of her property upon her death. She then testified that she intended to leave it to her children. The husband had testified earlier to the effect that she had asked him and tried to persuade him to make a will leaving their house to the Jehovah's Witnesses. The court did not err in admitting the testimony of the appellee since it was relevant to the question as to what disposition appellee would want Mr. Reagan to make of his property at his death and would tend to rebut his testimony that she tried to influence him to give the home to the Jehovah's Witnesses. This question would bear not only upon the credibility of appellant but upon the broader issue of the degree of his wife's involvement with the Jehovah's Witnesses. Such involvement, depending upon its degree, would bear upon the question whether the husband was justified in leaving her when he did and whether she would be justified in refusing to resume marital relations with him, if it is believed that he had tried to get them back together. Thus, its relevancy bears directly upon the main issues of the case and the testimony of appellee was properly admitted.
"... the court thus finds sufficient evidence to substantiate plaintiff's grounds for extreme cruelty and hereby grants to the plaintiff a divorce.... ..."... it appears to this court from a careful analysis of the testimony elicited from the witnesses testifying in this case that even though the defendant's motives may have been good, nevertheless if his conduct destroys 'the legitimate ends and objects of matrimony', then his actions have constituted extreme cruelty.
..."The court further finds, that because of the tender age of the children and because there is no testimony to controvert the fact that the plaintiff is a fit, proper and suitable person to have custody and control of the said children, that the plaintiff is therefore awarded exclusive custody and control of the children of said parties until further order of the court.
"The court also feels that there should be reasonable visitation rights on the part of the defendant to see his children at such times as are mutually agreed between the parties."
**************
**************
HAM v. CAVETTE was a 1962 Texas appellate court decision. Claudie A. Ham and Karlita Cavette Ham were married in June 1951, and divorced in July 1957. Custody of their two children, Kathy, who was born November in 1953, and Claudie Allin, Jr., who was born in 1954, was awarded to Karlita Ham. Karlita Ham died in March 1958. In April 1958, Claudie A. Ham, who had remarried, petitioned the court for custody of his two children. The hearing was held in June 1958.
**************
SMITH v. SMITH was a 1961 Supreme Court of Arizona decision. Limited details only. In September 1957, Betty Jean Smith was granted a divorce from John Paul Smith. Care, custody and control of their child, Mark, was granted to Betty Jean Smith, with reasonable visitorial rights given to John Paul Smith. At the time, the minor child, being then six years old, was enrolled in the first grade in the public schools in Phoenix, Arizona. On August 4th, 1958, just prior to the start of the child's second year in school, John Paul Smith petitioned the superior court for a change of custody, alleging that the child was not receiving proper care, teaching and education. Following a hearing, an order was entered changing the custody from Betty Jean Smith to John Paul Smith during the upcoming school year.
"The first challenge to the aspirations of the family presented itself to [Reinhardt L. Frantzen] on a night in April, 1958, when upon his return from a Scout Meeting, he found [Betti Rose Frantzen] in company with--apparently engaged in a conference, known as a 'Study Session' -- with three members of the local Jehovah Witness Organization. As soon as the parties to the cause were alone, [Reinhardt L. Frantzen] expressed his apprehension to [Betti Rose Frantzen] and requested her to desist in further studying with the group. [Betti Rose Frantzen] refused, claiming [Reinhardt L. Frantzen's] apprehension unfounded and insisted that [Reinhardt L. Frantzen] meet with [Betti Rose Frantzen] and the local Jehovah Witness leader -- 'Pioneer' --so as to become informed of the true purposes of the Jehovah Witnesses. ... In this meeting, the [Reinhardt L. Frantzen] was informed by the Pioneer, Jehovah Witnesses believe and advocate that: (a) 'All world governments are ruled by the devil', (b) for such reason Jehovah Witnesses refuse to take part in any governmental activities such as voting, offering for public office, service on juries, refuse to salute the Flag and to pledge allegiance to any Nation; ... ."
**************
RECOMMENDED READING:
Jehovah's Witnesses and the Problem of Mental Illness
The Theocratic War Doctrine: Why Jehovah's Witnesses Lie In Court
Blood Transfusions: A History and Evaluation of the Religious, Biblical, and Medical Objections (Jehovah's Witnesses perspective)
<<<------PREVIOUS PAGE----------HOME PAGE----------NEXT PAGE ------>>>
JW DIVORCES - 1960s
bravenet.com