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DIVORCE, BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS, AND
OTHER LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING
CHILDREN OF JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES
There is no such thing as a "national child custody law". Although similar, each state's legislature has established its own state laws regarding child custody, and each state's courts interpret those laws using legal standards that may vary from that used by courts in other states.
As site visitors will quickly see from reading the following summaries, state courts apply one of the following three different legal standards when deciding these cases:
1. Actual Or Substantial Harm: Existing actual or substantial harm to the child must be proven to have been caused by a parent's religious practices before the court will restrict that parent's constitutional rights. Such states include California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont and Washington.
2. Risk Of Harm. For a court to restrict a parent's constitutional rights, it only has to be proven that that a parent's religious practices pose a risk of harm to the child. Such states include Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina and Pennsylvania.
3. No Harm Required. In only a few states, such as Arkansas and Wisconsin, a parent who has sole legal custody also has the exclusive right to determine the child's religious education.
Child custody court case decisions are typically lengthy and complex, and tyically deal with a multitude of legal issues. The following case summaries will generally include only with those issues in which the WatchTower/Jehovah's Witness religion was a factor. Some summaries may omit one or more issues relevant to the court's final decision(s), but not deemed relevant to the theme of this website.
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1980-1985 COURT DECISIONS
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IN RE HAWKINS and HAWKINS v. HAWKINS were related 1984 Pennsylvania cases. In 1984, a Pittsburgh area Jehovah's Witness Couple, named William Hawkins Jr. and Edith [Henderson] Hawkins, 43, were in the process of divorcing when Edith Hawkins was killed in an automobile accident. The two JW Families apparently fought over the time scheduling of the funeral at one of Pittsburgh's Kingdom Halls of Jehovah's Witnesses given that an uncle of Edith Hawkins, named William Lee, sought and obtained a court order delaying the funeral for several days, so that more of Edith's relatives could attend.
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DEHN v. CHILDREN'S HOME SOCIETY OF FLORIDA was a 1983 Florida court decision. In mid-1982, a Jehovah's Witness Couple, named John Dehn and Bonnie Dehn, of Minneapolis, Minnesota, applied to adopt a baby boy, born in September 1982, to a Tampa, Florida Jehovah's Witness Mother, who gave up the baby to CHSoF for adoption. The Dehns were approved, and in December 1982, they traveled from Minnesota to St. Peterburg's to complete the adoption process, and pick up their new son.
However, on arrival in Florida, the Dehns refused to sign CHSoF paperwork which required then to authorize necessary blood transfusions for the baby during the initial six-months long "trial period", during which the Dehns and CHSoF maintained joint custody of the child. Thus, CHSoF declined to place the baby with the Dehns, and thereafter placed the baby boy with another couple. Thereafter, the Dehns filed this lawsuit in which they alleged that CHSoF had violated their consitutional right to freedom of religion.
In February 1983, a state judge ruled against the Dehns, and wisely avoided the constitutional issue. The judge ruled that the Dehns had told CHSoF that they would NOT contest CHSoF's decision, and that CHSoF had relied on that promise in proceeding to place the baby boy with another couple. Yet, the Dehns had filed this lawsuit only a few days thereafter.
Second, the judge noted that the original application that the Dehns had signed with their adoption agency in Minnesota had also required them to consent to necessary blood transfusions, plus the CHSoF paperwork and adoption forms, which had been sent to them in August 1982, had the same requirement (which had been highlighted by agency staff who were aware that the Dehns were JWs), and the Dehns never once objected about such until they arrived to pick up the baby in December 1982.
Interestingly, the court hearing was attended by a roomful of JWs. Does anyone else suspect that CHSoF had been set up for a lengthy constitutional fight, which this state judge craftily killed.
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"We cannot agree with Father's argument that [state law] allows a critical examination of the religious beliefs, tenets, and practices of parents in custody proceedings. While this specific issue has not been addressed by the Colorado appellate courts, the general rule is that religious decisions and acts may be considered in a custody proceeding only to the extent that those decisions or acts will jeopardize the mental health or physical safety of the child. Thus, the trial court's limitation of evidence to practices which affect the physical or mental health of the children was correct.
"Evidence of religious practices, in order to be admissible must relate to more than just a possibility of future harm. We note that in a dependency determination under [state law], the court can consider only those religious practices which actually endanger the physical or mental well-being of the child. This is because of the heavy burden upon the states to justify any infringement of an individual's First Amendment freedoms. ... Thus, we hold that, in custody proceedings, for evidence of a religious practice to be admitted, the proponent of such evidence must establish that there is a substantial probability that such practice will result in actual harm or endangerment to the child's physical or mental health. Otherwise, such evidence may not play any part in a custody determination.
"Here, the trial court determined that the offered evidence did not tend to establish a substantial probability of harm and thus it was not relevant and would not be admitted. This determination of relevance is within the court's sound discretion. We have reviewed the record and we agree with the trial court's determination that the excluded evidence was not relevant to a determination of whether the children's physical or mental health was actually endangered by the beliefs, tenets, or practices of mother's religion. In this regard, we note that Father was granted substantial visitation rights with his children."
Trial and appellate court judges who actually believe that the WatchTower Society's teachings and practices relating to disfellowshipping, shunning, and others noted above, are not relevant to the determination of whether children's physical or mental health is endangered by the beliefs, tenets, or practices of mother's religion" are ignoramuses.
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WILGER v. STATE OF ALABAMA were a series of state and federal court cases -- starting in the early 1970s and continuing into the early 1980s -- that involved a Jehovah's Witness Couple, named Anthony M. Wilger and Martha D. Wilger, and their eight children, some of whom include Dorothy Wilger, Sandra Wilger, Joseph Wilger, etc.
The Wilgers apparently were originally from Wisconsin, where they reportedly started having children nearly every year starting in the early 1960s. The Wilgers relocated to Alabama in 1969, and not long thereafter started having encounters with child welfare officials. Starting in 1973, and involving multiple state "neglect" actions, custody of all 8 children was gradually removed from Anthony Wilger and Martha Wilger, and placed with various state agencies.
In 1977, the Wilgers filed a ONE BILLION DOLLAR lawsuit against various state officials and agencies. Outcome unknown, but it did reach the appellate level, but was probably eventually dismissed.
In 1980, the Wilgers filed a SIX MILLION DOLLAR lawsuit against various state officials and agencies after the by-then 17 year-old Sandra Wilger became pregnant and had an abortion while living in a state-operated group home. By 1983, the last of the state claims were finally dismissed by the Alabama Supreme Court.
One media article reported that Martha Wilger suffered from a "brain disease", and that Sandra Wilger suffered from a "significantly low" IQ. The Wilgers reportedly blamed their many troubles on "white neighbors" who complained about their socializing with "blacks".
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"Jeffrey B. has inferred that this court lacks the jurisdiction to interfere with his rights as a father to direct his children's religious education and training and it would invade his constitutional rights contrary to the freedom of religion and separation of church and State clauses of the Federal and New York State Constitutions if the court does so."Having the custodial parent determine the religious upbringing of a child is necessary in order to limit the conflict and trauma on said child. In the present matter, these children are emotionally strained and torn as a result of the conflict of religious beliefs of their parents. It has been difficult for the children to reconcile the teachings of the Catholic Church with that of the Jehovah's Witnesses. The best interests of these children dictate that they be subject to being reared in only one religion. Since the parents are unable to agree on the subject, this court must make a determination which is in the children's best interest. As they grow and develop they may do as did their father and change their choice of religion or choose none at all, but it is clearly evident from the proof herein, they are being emotionally and physically strained as a result of the conflict of their parents' religious beliefs.
..."... In light of the strained relationship between the parties as evidenced by the many proceedings in this and other courts and the decision in this proceeding, the order of this court of January 15, 1980 shall be and hereby is modified and amended by adding the following decretal provision:'Ordered, that said respondent/father shall refrain from instructing said children in the teachings of the Jehovah's Witnesses and shall also refrain from taking said children to any assemblies, meetings, conventions, religious services or other social or religious activities of the Jehovah's Witnesses during his periods of custodial visitation.'"
"The Family Court's order should be affirmed. As a general rule, it is the custodial parent who is the appropriate person for determining the religious upbringing of the children. We conclude that the court would be intruding on petitioner's First Amendment rights were it to enjoin the noncustodial parent from discussing religion with his child absent a showing that the child will thereby be harmed. In the instant matter, the record amply supports the court's finding that the children were being 'harmed' by [Jeffrey Bentley's] actions in instructing and involving them in the teachings of the Jehovah's Witnesses. The 'best interests' of the children is the threshold consideration in a custody proceeding ... . The Family Court was well within its broad discretionary power in reaching its determination that the best interests of these children dictate that they be reared in only one religion. We find also without merit [Jeffrey Bentley's] contention that he was denied due process by the Family Court's refusal to allow cross-examination of the Law Guardian concerning his interviews with the two children. ... the interviews are privileged since the relationship of the Law Guardian and the children is one of "attorney-client" and, as such, is not subject to cross-examination. Order affirmed"
"... [Wayne Felton] shall hereafter have the right to visit and to take Deborah Jean Felton and Jennifer Lynn Felton, minor children of said parties, at reasonable times, provided that he refrains from giving his children any religious training or education which shall be in conflict or contrary with the religious training and beliefs of the custodial parent."
"'The courts have refused to restrain the noncustodial parent from exposing the minor child to his or her religious beliefs and practices, absent a clear, affirmative showing that these religious activities will be harmful to the child. ... The refusal to intervene in the absence of a showing of harm to the child reflects the protected nature of religious activities and expressions of belief, as well as the proscription against preferring one religion over another.'"... The parents together have freedom of religious expression and practice which enters into their liberty to manage the familial relationships. ... But the 'best interests' of the child are to be promoted, and when the parents are at odds, the attainment of that purpose may involve some limitation of the liberties of one or other of the parents. ... However, harm to the child from conflicting religious instructions or practices, which would justify such a limitation, should not be simply assumed or surmised; it must be demonstrated in detail. ..."If the dominating goal of the enterprise is to serve a child's best interests, ... then it might be thought to follow that a policy of stability or repose should be adopted by which the child would be exposed to but one religion (presumably that of the custodial parent) at whatever cost to the 'liberties' of the other parent. ... The law, however, tolerates and even encourages up to a point the child's exposure to the religious influences of both parents although they are divided in their faiths. This, we think, is because the law sees a value in 'frequent and continuing contact' of the child with both its parents ... and thus contact with the parents' separate religious preferences. There may also be a value in letting the child see, even at an early age, the religious models between which it is likely to be led to choose in later life. And it is suggested, sometimes, that a diversity of religious experience is itself a sound stimulant for a child. ... In all events, the question that comes to the courts is whether, in particular circumstances, such exposures are disturbing a child to its substantial injury, physical or emotional, and will have a like harmful tendency for the future. ...... ..."We have noted the meagerness of the evidence on such elementary points as the precise manner of Wayne's Bible lessons. The more striking weakness is a failure of proof about Deborah's physical and emotional condition or about any causal connections between her visits with her father and that condition, such as it may have been. General testimony by Diane that the child was upset or confused (and that testimony was contradicted by testimony of like generality on the part of Wayne) will not suffice. ... There are few ground-level facts to be found in the record on this entire matter. The decisions hold such an infirmity to be fatal to an action seeking to limit materially or to cancel visitation rights. ... Thus there is clear error, for lack of foundation in the record, in the judge's findings of a 'deleterious effect' on the children and an 'undermining' of the custodial relationship by reason of the father's religious instruction or practice. The findings seem traceable to a predisposition on the judge's part. His remarks during the hearing would indicate that, despite some protestations by him to the contrary, he assumed that differences of religion, at least where one of the parents took his religion zealously, must have such grave damaging effect on the children as to require the censorship he imposed by the judgment. The assumption is far from self-proving. ...... ..."Upon the reversal of the judgment of modification appealed from (which will have the effect of restoring the original judgment) and remand of the case to the Probate Court, Diane may, if so advised, again apply for modification upon additional and updated evidence. A suggestion of the kind of proof that might be influential on either side, and the likely sources of such proof, appears by implication in Pope v. Pope, ... where, upon reversing an order restricting visitation on account of religious differences, the court said the custodial mother 'gave no testimony whatever that his [child's] general demeanor, attitude, school work, appetite, health or outlook has been affected one iota by the so-called conflict in his mind. Her testimony was wholly uncorroborated. No church, school, medical or psychiatric authorities, nor any of the boy's associates, in or out of school, appeared in support of this charge.' We should mention, too, that a judge may seek correction of the possibly self-serving testimonies of the father and mother by appointing a qualified investigator (whether called a guardian or given some other title) who would look into the facts, render a report, and be subject to examination by the parties. ...
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"After careful examination of the record, however, we can perceive no basis for interfering with Family Court's exercise of its discretion in awarding custody to the mother ... . Five days of hearings were conducted before the court, which was in a position to assess the demeanor and credibility of the parents The discretionary power of the Family Court in matters of custody is broad and must be 'accorded the greatest respect'. .. Here, the court's exercise of its discretion is reasonably substantiated by the evidence contained in the record ... and in the absence of an abuse of discretion, an appellate court should not set aside a custody award upon the ground that the other parent is also fit to care for the child."
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OSIER v. OSIER was a 1980 Maine Supreme Court decision. Jay Osier and Barbara Osier were divorced on Jay Osier's petition in June 1976. No court order was made regarding the custody of their 4 year old son, although the parties agreed that Barbara Osier would retain physical custody due to Jay Osier's military duties in the U.S. Navy. Jay Osier subsequently remarried, and he then filed for custody in October 1978.
At the hearing, one of Jay Osier's arguments was that Barbara Osier was a Jehovah's Witness who would not consent to their son's receiving a blood transfusion if such ever became medically necessary. On December 12, 1978, a final order granted custody of the child to the father and his present wife, with visitation rights to the mother. In his "Findings of Fact and Decision thereon" the District Court judge stated that the mother's religious practice in regard to blood transfusions raised an "issue of major importance." On the basis of the mother's testimony that she would withhold her consent to a blood transfusion for her son even if it became medically necessary to safeguard the child's health, the court concluded "that the (mother's) religious beliefs are such that they would endanger the physical well-being or life of their child."
Barbara Osier appealed the judgment. She lost at the Superior Court level, but then the Maine Supreme Court concluded: "We conclude from the limited record before us that the District Court in granting custody to the father gave undue weight to the fact that the mother as a Jehovah's Witness would not consent to a blood transfusion for the son. Since the custody decision implicates the constitutionally sensitive areas of religious freedom and familial relationships, we vacate the judgments below and remand the case to the District Court for the purpose of making a custody determination in accordance with the principles here enunciated."
"When, as in this case, it appears to the divorce court that an appropriate determination of custody will involve inquiry into the consequences of the religious practices of one of the parents, the court must be alert to the impact that its order concerning care and custody may have on that parent's fundamental rights under the due process clause ... and the religious freedom clause. ... Second, any decision terminating or limiting the right of a parent to physical custody of his child also affects his constitutionally protected liberty interest in maintaining his familial relationship with the child. ...
"As a general rule courts should endeavor to resolve the controversies before them without deciding constitutional issues, reaching such an issue only 'if it is entirely necessary to a decision in the cause in which it is raised.' ... Therefore, in approaching a case of this sort the divorce court should make a preliminary determination of the child's best interest, Without giving any consideration to either parent's religious practices, in order to ascertain which of them is the preferred custodial parent. Where that preliminary determination discloses that the religious practices of only the Nonpreferred parent are at issue, any need for the court to delve into a constitutionally sensitive area is avoided.
"If, on the other hand, that preliminary determination discloses a preference for the parent whose religious practices have been placed in issue, the divorce court, in fashioning an appropriate custody order, may take into account the consequences upon the child of that parent's religious practices. Because of the sensitivity of the constitutional rights involved, however, any such inquiry must proceed along a two-stage analysis designed to protect those rights against unwarranted infringement. To summarize that analysis briefly: First, in order to assure itself that there exists a factual situation necessitating such infringement, the court must make a threshold factual determination that the child's temporal well-being is immediately and substantially endangered by the religious practice in question and, if that threshold determination is made, Second, the court must engage in a deliberate and articulated balancing of the conflicting interests involved, to the end that its custody order makes the least possible infringement upon the parent's liberty interests consistent with the child's well-being. In carrying out that two-stage analysis, the trial court should make, on the basis of record evidence, specific findings of fact concerning its evaluation of all relevant considerations bearing upon its ultimate custody order...."It is firmly established that 'the right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose .. the child ... to ill health or death.' ... Thus, the divorce court, where it finds that a particular religious practice poses an immediate and substantial threat to the child's well-being, ... may make an order aimed at protecting the child from that threat."We therefore agree with the mother's principal contention on appeal, that the first amendment guarantee of religious liberty prohibits the divorce court from taking her religious practices into account in determining custody unless such practices pose an immediate and substantial threat to the temporal well-being of the child. The mother further contends, however, that the mere remote statistical probability that a normal, healthy child may require a blood transfusion at some time in the future is as a matter of law an insufficient reason to impinge upon her religious liberty. Since we have no way of knowing what that statistical probability is, we decline now to rule upon that contention.
"If and only if the court is satisfied that an immediate and substantial threat to the child's well-being is posed by the religious practice in question, need it proceed to the second stage of the inquiry, requiring it to engage in an explicit balancing of the conflicting interests. In fashioning the appropriate order, the court should adopt a means of protecting the best interests of the child that makes the least possible intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the parent. .. This balancing process requires the judge to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the alternative remedies available. Although this court is not now willing to say that an order completely denying custody may never be appropriate where the temporal welfare of the child is genuinely threatened by a religious practice of the parent seeking custody, the divorce court should explore every reasonable alternative before resorting to such a drastic solution. .. Although a less restrictive order does not completely remove the 'price tag' from the custodial parent's exercise of his first amendment liberty, it significantly lowers the price of its exercise, preserving intact the continuing familial relationship to which he is otherwise entitled.
"We emphasize that the court, when faced with a question of this nature, must never assume that a threat to the child's welfare exists. Rather, at this threshold stage of the inquiry, the court must conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the religious practice at issue in fact poses an immediate and substantial risk to the temporal well-being of the child. ... An affirmative finding to that effect, supported by substantial evidence is a necessary prerequisite to a valid order concerning the care or custody of a child that infringes to any significant degree upon the religious liberty of one parent.
"At oral argument, counsel had no recollection of any evidence before the District Court that we view sufficient to justify a finding that the mother's religious practice posed an immediate and substantial threat to the child. The court's sole finding concerning the boy's health indicates that he is a normal and active 8-year-old. We do not know what specific evidence, if any, was available concerning his proneness to accidents or to illnesses requiring blood transfusions. Furthermore, facts such as the statistical frequency of blood transfusions for normal children aged eight and older and the degree of risk involved in taking or refusing blood or chemical substitutes, are not the proper subjects of judicial notice but must be proved by evidence, like any other facts, in the court of first instance. In the absence of any such proof of that threshold factual requirement, there could be no legitimate occasion for the court's impingement upon the mother's constitutionally protected liberty interests.
"Turning to the case at bar, the District Court was faced with a sensitive constitutional issue, and one that was novel to Maine. As we have indicated, the court's initial error lay in failing to make a preliminary determination of which parent would be the better custodian, independently of any consideration of the mother's religious practices But even if we were to overlook that error and to assume that some degree of inquiry was warranted in this case, our examination of what record is available on appeal, as explained by counsel for both parties, makes plain to us that the court neither purported to use, nor had before it, evidence legally sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the two-stage analysis we have described as necessary to protect the sensitive constitutional rights involved against unwarranted infringement."Remand to the District Court is therefore necessary for a completely new hearing on the father's motion seeking custody. As a preliminary matter, the court must determine, Exclusive of any religious factor, which parent is better suited to have custody. If the father prevails on that preliminary inquiry, the entire matter is settled. If, on the other hand, the court concludes that the child's welfare is best served by awarding custody to the mother, any subsequent inquiry into the consequences upon the child of her religious practices must be strictly in accordance with this opinion.
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DUDLEY v. DUDLEY was an Oklahoma divorce case which occurred sometime in the latter 1970s or early 1980s. Shortly after James Dudley was assigned to Bryan County, Oklahoma, by the United States Department of Fish and Wildlife, around 1967, his wife converted to the Jehovah's Witnesses.
Years later, James Dudley claimed that he objected to his wife's conversion from the very beginning due to the WatchTower Society's teaching that his employer, the Government of the United States, was "of the Devil". Dudley also objected to the WatchTower Society's teachings against blood transfusions given that one of his three daughter had already needed such. Apparently, several years of contention over WatchTower doctrines being practiced by his wife and taught to their three daughters passed before the marriage finally ended in divorce.
Then, in July 1985, James Dudley learned that his ex-wife was going to re-marry, and it was to another JW in the Bennington, Oklahoma area. Dudley lost his composure when he learned that he had been made out to have committed adultery in order for the marriage to have been approved***, and ended up attempting to hold a Bar-B-Q at the local Kingdom Hall. Dudley was eventually convicted of second degree arson, and sentenced to one year in jail.
*** Over the decades, there have been multiple incidents of divorced JWs falsely swearing that their ex-spouses had committed adultery, so that they could get congregation approval to remarry. Typically, the LIAR is an active JW "in good standing", while the person falsely accused has left the JWs. Thus, the moronic Elders choose to believe the lying JW over the inncoent ex-JW. This exact same thing occurred to me. The morons at the Berea, Kentucky Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses gave my ex-wife permission to remarry after she signed a sworn document that I had committed adultery. I had not. Even my own JW relatives, who knew that I had not committed adultery, attended her wedding. I look forward to the day when I am able to confront not only my ex-wife, but all her JW co-conspirators, in the courtroom presided over by Jesus Christ.
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RECOMMENDED READING:
Jehovah's Witnesses and the Problem of Mental Illness
The Theocratic War Doctrine: Why Jehovah's Witnesses Lie In Court
Blood Transfusions: A History and Evaluation of the Religious, Biblical, and Medical Objections (Jehovah's Witnesses perspective)
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JW DIVORCES - 1980-1984
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